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

TRAINING

LIEUTENANTS AS TRAINERS

HUMINT SELF-HELP

HOW THE SOVIETS TRAIN

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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

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VANTAGE POINT

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

The Army's most important training manual, Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force,* provides the philosophy and the techniques to plan and conduct training oriented on wartime missions. It applies equally to tactical and strategic Military Intelligence units as it does to the Combat Arms. The manual is a pleasure to read; it's short, to the point, easy to understand and deals with the Army's number one priority—training.

The central concept in Field Manual 25-100 is Battle Focus. By "Battle Focusing" our efforts, we identify those tasks that a unit must do in war and then we train to do them. Battle Focus is a recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency on every possible task due to either time or resource constraints. By narrowing the focus to a small number of vital tasks essential to mission accomplishment we can conduct a successful training program. The most important thing leaders can do for soldiers and units is to focus their energies.

The way to begin a battle-focused training program is to identify wartime requirements and then selectively identify tasks that are essential to the accomplishment of the wartime mission. The resulting list of tasks is the **mission essential task list** (METL) which is used to focus all training efforts. While developing METL commanders involve their staffs and subordinate commanders. This ensures mutual supportability and understanding of the METL throughout the unit. The Command Sergeant Major and senior NCO leaders must be included in the METL development so that they can integrate individual tasks into METL driven training programs—this is a team effort.

We must remember that there is no generic or standard METL—each is developed based on unique wartime missions and extended directives. A unit's METL must apply to the entire organization, must compliment the higher headquarter's METL, and be stabilized. There should be no attempt to prioritize tasks within the METL.

The concept of battle focus is applicable to all our diverse MI organizations. Senior leaders in MI TDA organizations such as field stations, counterintelligence units and multi-discipline organizations must devise METL from critical peacetime as well as wartime missions. Mission essential tasks may be either critical training tasks or operational activities required to accomplish the organization's ongoing mission. Establishment of a METL for G2, S2 and other intelligence staffs is just as important as the articulation of unit METL.

After review and approval of subordinate units' METL, battle tasks are selected. A battle task is a subordinate unit's mission essential task that is so critical that its accomplishment will determine the success of the next higher organization's mission essential task.

We are now taking the development of tasks down to a resolution that can be managed in a training program. We can now apply standards and conditions to the hierarchy of tasks so we can plan, execute and assess our battle focused training program. For example, a measurable task under the mission essential task of **"deploy the battalion"** could be **"conduct an alert,"** with applied, observable and measurable standards such as: "Alert rosters will be 97 percent correct, 90 percent of present for duty soldiers will be contacted in one hour, and 90 percent of the present for duty soldiers will be assembled within 2.5 hours." Standards can be obtained from external directives, Mission Training Plans Drills, local SOP or deployment plans.

After establishing battle focus, the planning, execution and assessment of a unit's training begins. This entire procedure is described in Field Manual 25-100. I expect every leader in MI to know, understand and apply the training concepts articulated in *Training the Force*. We don't have the resources to waste our soldiers' time on training that is not METL related. Commanders throughout MI should use their approved METL to shield their units from activities that do not contribute to mission accomplishment in peacetime or combat. **We must train to keep the peace.**

Command Sergeant Major David P. Klehn

As you well know, the whole reason for our wearing the green suit is to be prepared to go into combat if that need arises. As MI NCOs, we must always remember that our responsibility is to train soldiers who will be able to survive and provide intelligence support to combat units to defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

The purpose of training is to prepare soldiers, teams and units to perform individual and collective tasks to a high standard. The question, "Does this training really prepare the soldiers to win in combat?" must guide the planning, execution, evaluation and assessment of training. The measure of training is the performance of the soldiers and units as they complete training.

The way we train is the way we are going to fight, because when we go to war we're going to be reacting. We're going to be doing those things we've done habitually in training. That is why training must be tough, realistic and battle-focused.

Battle focus is an attitude that must be instilled in all soldiers. We must do what we need to do in peacetime to be absolutely ready for war.

Battle focus is a concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Battle focus guides the planning, execution and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure its members train as they are going to fight. Battle focus is a recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraints. However, commanders can achieve a successful training program by consciously narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment. Therefore, commanders must selectively identify the tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organization's wartime mission. This is called the mission essential tasks list (METL).

Commanders involve subordinate commanders and their CSMs in METL development to create a team approach to battle-focused training. Subordinate participation develops a common understanding of the organization's critical wartime requirements so that METLs throughout the organization are mutually supporting. Subordinate commanders can subsequently apply insights gained during preparation of the next higher headquarters' METL to the development of their own METL. The CSM and other key NCOs must understand the organization's collective METL so that they can integrate individual tasks into each collective mission essential task during METL-based training.

After the commander designates the collective mission essential tasks required to accomplish his organization's wartime mission, the CSM and senior NCOs develop a supporting individual task list for each mission essential task. Soldier training publications and mission training plans are major source documents for selecting appropriate individual tasks.

After the METL has been identified, commanders establish supporting standards and conditions for each task. The conditions and standards provide a clear statement of expected training performance.

You can find what I have described above in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*. This manual provides authoritative foundations for individual, leader and unit training. After an organization has done the above, it is ready to begin the training management cycle of planning, execution and assessment. A new manual is being developed that focuses on the "how to" at battalion level and lower. FM 25-XY is in draft now and has been distributed for comments.

Every NCO is expected to know, understand and apply the concepts in these manuals. NCOs have the primary role in training and developing individual skills that integrate into each collective mission essential task. Success on the battlefield will depend on how well NCOs have trained their soldiers.

General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, said: "Training will remain the Army's top priority because it is the cornerstone of combat readiness!"

The MI NCO must be **ALWAYS OUT FRONT** in being a trainer.

FROM THE EDITOR

Hello Soldiers,

A funny thing happened. I asked you for your thoughts about training, and so many of you wanted to share your ideas and programs that I didn't have enough pages in this issue to print even half of the items I received. Thank you for your professional interest. We'll continue discussing training in the JAN-MAR 1990 issue. Let's also take a look at the way we train our staff officers. My deadline for selecting articles for our next issue is the first of November. Please feel free to send good black and white photos to accompany your work.

Let me give you a progress report for the last six months. We've made some significant changes in the way we do business here.

>We've made a new subscription/distribution arrangement with the Superintendent of Documents to provide you better service in those areas. If you have a problem—call us.

>We've changed the format and the look of the bulletin to make it more readable. We make an extra effort to follow the principles of Effective Army Writing so that the articles and features instruct and entertain—not just provide a platform for ego-flexing.

>We've shifted our focus to topics and issues relevant to MI soldiers and work to be more responsive to their interests.

I sincerely want the professional bulletin to become something useful and enjoyable for MI soldiers. That's my job. Please feel free to call or write me to offer suggestions for improvement.

Thanks,

John Vance, editor



LETTERS

Dear Editor:

In my 24 years of service I have been trained how to train by some of the Army's best trainers. One of them instilled in me these ideas about good trainers.

Good trainers like to train, know how to train and motivate others to train to standards. They know that good training is usually tough and is not always joyful, but that it produces victory with minimum casualties in war. They also know that most soldiers expect good training and will lose confidence in leaders when training is not good.

Good trainers know that training includes safety, esprit, logistics, administration, intelligence, quality of life, financial management, physical conditioning and tactics. Above all **it is discipline**. Good trainers "sell" their function, be it intelligence, firepower, logistics, administration, communications, mobility or command. Good trainers "buy" functions they do not have.

Good trainers constantly evaluate and give pluses and minuses for the good, bad and the ugly. They understand that they are the **coach** and not the "cheerleader." Cheerleaders cheer even when performance is inexcusably below standards. The coach—who at the proper time can be the best cheerleader—does not approve of performance inexcusably below standards. The coach knows how to balance the pat on the back and the "boot in the psychological rear."

Good trainers plan and execute combined arms training. They find ways to train the "company" ("battalion"), even though the specific subject may be a "platoon" ("company"). They "know" if shooting is accurate, if marching units in a parade are disciplined and ready; they know if staffs are properly trained, motivated and utilized.

Good trainers "execute" what has just been written above.

Colonel Joseph M. Blair III
Commander, 111th Military Intelligence Brigade

"Good trainers like to train, know how to train and motivate others to train to standards."

*The following are excerpts from letters sent by personnel of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C., who participated in the Dragonfix tests (July-September 1989 issue of **Military Intelligence**).*

Dear Editor:

From the most experienced personnel to those with little or no experience at all, the single station locator (SSL) was a great system for everyone connected with it. This was an opportunity to have a system really built to the operator's needs.

I feel that this is going to be an excellent system for the Army. There are a lot of changes that need to be made and more aspects must be tested. Once these are finished, the system will be one of the best in the Army.

Private First Class Donald Keir

The deployment to Texas, during March and April of this year, was more than just a test of the new Dragonfix SSL system. It was also an opportunity for training, travel, and for families to learn to cope while the military member was away, etc.

Since this was a brand new system, no manuals designed specifically for instruction existed nor were there any experienced instructors. Even the technical manuals used for training were not entirely accurate. From the beginning to the end of the test, we were caught in a stream of constant discovery; discoveries that helped us to operate Dragonfix with ever increasing efficiency and accuracy.

Specialist Four Karen C. Turcotte

We soldiers at the Brady Site had our problems with the AN/TSQ-164 Dragonfix. We had been told that we were going to set up the system at Brady because it supposedly met most of the requirements for the ideal location. The ground was relatively flat but completely covered with cactus and mesquite trees. The area

also came with a lovely supply of pack rats. You could not leave anything lying around that was easy for the rats to carry or it would soon be gone. The worst thing about the rats was the enjoyment they got chewing through the guy wires of our antennas. We had to roll up all the cables and put the antenna elements out of reach of all night creatures. We couldn't do much about the guy wires because we didn't want to take down the antennas each night. We had the night guard roam through the antennas to keep an eye on the guy wires.

Even though we didn't have a very demanding schedule, it was a stressful time. The system added greatly to the stress because it was definitely not a finished product.

Sergeant Dorothy Naegele

After a successful convoy from Fort Bragg to Fort Hood (roughly 1,350 miles), the Blue and Red teams prepared to receive the new SSL system. The Blue teams deployed to their sites at Bergstrom AFB, Brady and Fort Hood, Texas. The Red teams accordingly hit the road for various predetermined locations to try and stifle the Blue Force capability.

Bergstrom served as net control station and Brady and Fort Hood served as outstations. From beginning to end, communications between SSL stations were a problem. The backup Goldwing system was used to effectively relay information between sites.

Overall, the testing of the SSL system was an educational and inspirational experience for the entire crew. Not only did we become knowledgeable and proficient on the Army's newest electronic warfare asset, we grew together as a cohesive unit, building the esprit de corps necessary to complete the mission.

Sergeant John Donnelly

The system at Brady exceeded all the operators' expectations with the exception of communications.

The testing was not without flaws and problems, but the work done by the test directors was truly commendable. Their sense of awareness, dedication and ability to understand the complex situation of having three distant sites, coupled with the hard work of the soldiers involved, was the main reason for the success of this test.

Along with the vast majority of the soldiers who worked with the AN/TSQ-164, I believe this can be an outstanding asset for the corps commander.

Sergeant Albert H. Battease

Dear Editor:

I would like to congratulate the authors of the article on Dragonfix, in the July-September 1989 issue of ***Military Intelligence***. They correctly point out the immense difficulties and multilayered bureaucracies one must contend with in developing, fielding and sustaining intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems.

Should the concept-based requirements system (CBRS) and the Army materiel acquisition process be more responsive to validate user needs, threat challenges and changes, and the several levels of conflict (e.g. LIC vs high intensity) with differing IEW requirements? The answer is most certainly yes, and, frankly, we in the IEW systems requirement and development business must share in the blame for what IEW systems have been fielded and for their problems.

The easy, attractive answer to this overall IEW systems problem is the one pursued by the authors—"off the shelf" or non-developmental item (NDI) procurements. As usual, however, the obvious easy and attractive solution is not the correct solution over the long run. This solution only addresses the symptoms of the problem—long lead time from requirements to fielding and long, thorough technical and operational testing procedures. The downside to the authors' solution is that several key supportability requirements were ignored to save time with little regard for future Dragonfix operations. Key among these slighted areas are-

(1) **Force Structure/ Billpayers:** How many people to run this system? Where do we get the spaces etc...?

(2) **Integrated Logistics Support (ILS):** Over the system lifecycle, what is the maintenance concept? What is the provisioning plan? How much contractor support required? Will the contractors go to war with you? How much will this NDI system really cost?

(3) **Manprint:** Things like human factors engineering, system safety, MOS determination, skill levels, etc....

(4) **IEW Doctrine:** Where will this system best be deployed? How to task it most efficiently? Is it really needed

when the XVIII ABN Corps most likely will have HF/DF support from an EAC MI brigade?

"...the obvious easy and attractive solution is not the correct solution over the long run."

These and other total system conceptual and fielding questions are addressed during the Army streamlined acquisitions process and, if done correctly, will lead to longer system life, correct fielding and development concepts, and strong ILS support for the system. There are several examples of great and wonderful "off the shelf" IEW systems purchased by commands such as FORSCOM that are now either permanently deadlined for lack of spare parts or organic maintenance. Even worse, some of these systems are not part of the MTOE but reside on the installation TDA (as training devices) and are by definition non-deployable and contractor maintained.

USAICS combat developers and TRADOC systems managers are striving to shorten the long CBRS-materiel acquisition process; however we will not sacrifice thoughtful, conceptual, force structure and ILS planning to blindly field so-called solutions that are not sustainable in the long-term.

Rand Dee Bowerman
Combat Development System Manager (UAV)
Directorate of Combat Developments
USAICS

Dear Editor:

Current counterintelligence (CI) training has provided a good base for the CI agents of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion. The field training is challenging and has been well thought out. The purpose of this letter is not to degrade or malign the training but rather to present new challenges to our CI agents and battalion.

I would like to see training become more realistic by creating a continual hostile environment with no startex or endex for exercises. This could be accomplished very easily within the 519th MI Battalion.

I propose that a specialized CI team be developed and deployed by CI agents of the battalion during normal FTXs. This team would function as a hostile intelligence/Spetnatz team (IST). The IST would be formed from B company and operated as a cell. The team would collect information on the battalion through legitimate sources, news letters and conversations (no elicitation), and then develop a hostile data base unit profile. The IST would be separated from B company three days prior to deployment to the field. During this time more information would be collected. The IST would attempt to follow the battalion to the field and set up in a specified area known only to IST members and the battalion commander. Once in the field the team would attempt to locate, sketch and photograph the elements of the 519th. During the FTX, the IST would use elicitation to determine the 519th strengths and weaknesses. Also, they could attempt to penetrate perimeters and with approval "assassinate/kidnap" personnel. These activities would be carefully conducted and coordinated with prior agreements to ensure no injuries or ill-feelings.

This team would add realism to our training by providing an unknown factor to the soldiers. They would now need to be aware of their surroundings and use OPSEC measures to ensure their survival and ability to complete their mission.

This type of training would greatly benefit B company by allowing their agents to try to neutralize this threat. For example, a soldier in A company is reported missing (kidnapping coordinated with battalion commander). A CI team investigates, makes a report, provides warnings. Now A company has to do without an interrogator for a set amount of time before a replacement soldier arrives (same soldier). This would benefit A company by presenting real-world problems and reactions.

Also, the CI teams would take descriptions of kidnappers or elicitors and through investigative procedures provide warnings and indications to commanders and neutralize the threat.

If we deploy into a hostile area our forces will be under continual observation and guerrilla-type attack. We will lose personnel and equipment despite our best preparation. We must be able to complete our missions despite these loses. Companies must learn how to adapt to hostile environments and casualties.

Paul P. Kaminsky
519th MI Battalion
Fort Bragg, N.C.



Common Tasks, Uncommon Training

by First Lieutenant Steven A. Brennan

"What's the difference between a private first class and a second lieutenant? The private first class has already been promoted twice!" This old joke still circulates among enlisted soldiers attending Advanced Individual Training (AIT), but it is losing its point at Fort Huachuca. Something new is happening at the Center of Excellence. Both officers and enlisted attend their initial qualification courses here, but until recently, they rarely trained together. Major General Parker, the Commandant of the Intelligence Center and School, stresses leader presence, realistic hands-on training, instructors and drill sergeants working together to produce MOS skilled soldiers, and tough, comprehensive end-of-course assessments. That's what we do at Site Freedom.

Situated in a canyon on the west range at Fort Huachuca, Site Freedom is a training area that allows both officers and enlisted soldiers to work together to develop their skills. Some AIT soldiers have misconceptions about Site Freedom. They fear that the officers will be tough and mean and "flunk" them. They are surprised that new officers seem particularly anxious to waste a Saturday evaluating common tasks. While it is not mandatory for officers to participate in Site Freedom, most do.

Site Freedom consists of two phases. In phase one, Common Task Testing (CTT), the soldier is evaluated on his ability to perform 24 Skill Level 1 tasks to standard.

CTT can be fun when you combine new officers with new enlisted soldiers. The officers are the graders, and the soldiers are the graded. The officers get to work with soldiers for the first time. They get to practice their leadership, as

well as learn about common soldier tasks. The soldiers get to work with the officers for the first time. They learn that officers really care and want them to succeed but will not compromise their standards. The soldiers also learn that they can count on their NCOs to train them well. They feel that if the officers pass them, they must be well-trained.

After CTT, soldiers begin phase two, the Tactical Application Exercise (TAX). TAX is five training lanes consisting of movement to contact, defense, react to sniper fire, searching POWs, and call for fire. The soldiers learn how important leadership and following orders is. During a recent TAX, when one soldier was placed in charge of a squad he asked why his buddy couldn't have the job instead. He said his buddy knew more about what was going on. When the lieutenant who was acting as grader said no, the squad leader wanted to "take a vote." The grader said no again because the squad leader had to learn to make decisions. The soldier learned that being a leader isn't as easy as it may look. The lieutenant was also developing his leadership. He had to train the soldier to make his own decisions and not to rely

on other people's advice.

During the TAX, the soldiers use Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES). They can see that they would die in combat if decisions are not made quickly. After movement to contact, the majority of the MILES are beeping. The soldiers quite often call out to the drill sergeant to "turn them off." They realize that they would be dead if they were really in combat. The drill sergeants walk along with the soldiers but don't interfere. They are primarily there for safety. They leave everything up to the new officers. If the AIT soldier isn't in a leadership position, he is learning how to be a member of a squad. When they fire off all their ammo and still have more enemy to face, they learn how to conserve ammunition. They learn how important the supply people are. The squad leader must think about resupply. The new officer must think about the class he had on logistics and teach the squad leader what would happen in a combat situation.

Site Freedom is a very successful tool that supports Major General Parker's training goals. It trains both the officer and the enlisted soldier at the same time. Both learn from each other. It takes a giant step towards ending the "us against them" between enlisted and officers. The brigade, battalion and company commanders attend the training, which reinforces the AIT soldier's understanding of command support. Officers and enlisted leave Site Freedom with a better understanding of each other.

First Lieutenant Steven A. Brennan is a graduate of the Marion Military Institute and Northern Illinois Univ. He completed the Air Defense Officer Basic Course at Fort Bliss, Texas. His last assignment was platoon leader, XO and assistant operations officer, 5/5th ADA and division battle staff 2nd ID, Korea. He is currently assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Brigades on Line!

by Major Jack H. Spencer

Like the Colossus of Rhodes, the 3d Armored Division straddles the Fulda Gap, ready to spearhead NATO's response to the sudden buildup of forces across the East German border. The 533rd Military Intelligence Battalion has already deployed COMINT and HUMINT collectors to predetermined vantage points within the one-kilometer zone. Their data is flooding into the Division G2 and pouring in from above; air reconnaissance sorties and 11th ACR scouts report indication of massive troop movement and suspicious changes in civilian traffic patterns. Clearly, a major attack is on the horizon, and the Division commander is hungry for specifics — where are the enemy command posts and staging areas? What routes are they likely to use? Where are their airfields and how well are they defended? And, most crucial, when will they be ready to mount the assault? All of this must be extracted from an ever-increasing mountain of raw data. Then to make matters worse, the enemy's feint in the southern sector triggers a premature withdrawal of MI assets to secondary positions outside the covering force area. This all but cripples the forward collection effort, making it even harder to answer those key questions. The commander is paralyzed. With a vastly outgunned and outmanned force, how can he be ready for the main attack when he doesn't know where it is coming from or which units will be leading it?

Fortunately, this scenario is not the first hours of World War III but only a realistic battle simulation designed to train MI officers, warrants and noncommissioned officers under high stress conditions. The G2 Workstation is specifically designed to exercise the brigade, division, corps and EAC intelligence cycle. And it does it very well. Other simulations, including the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), tend to focus mainly on maneuver and firepower decisions, including other battlefield operating systems required to support the maneuver aspects.

While the Workstation simulation is aimed primarily at basic and advanced course commissioned and warrant officer training, it is well suited to supporting the requirements of a field division as the 7th Division (Light) proved in November 1988. The 7th ID(L) was the third FORSCOM unit to exercise using the simulation. The simulation cannot accommodate the addition of the unit's designation or unique equipment, but all standard collection gear and intelligence organizations are duplicated. Some unit-unique equipment can be duplicated as well.

The 7th brought almost all of the Division intelligence system, including S2s from all the brigades, DIVARTY and combat aviation brigade. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 brought virtually all of the key personnel from operations, plans, collection management, the All Source Production Section, counterintelligence operations and the rear area combat operations cell. The 107th MI Battalion (Light) brought their A and B company commanders, the battalion staff, the Technical Control and Analysis Element, the Counterintelligence Operations Section and the Interrogation Prisoner of War Section. Some elements of I Corps G2 staff participated in the exercise as well.

The Division completed the BCTP Warfighter Exercise at Fort Lewis in September and developed precise training goals. Key among these were the continual and related problems of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), collection management, resource tasking, reporting, analysis and refinement of the collection plan. These functions, along with requests for information from subordinate units actually form

the sum of activity in the intelligence system. Of particular interest to us was the level of detail in the collection plan for all disciplines. This critical function is driven by, and drives, analysis. The more analyzed detail you possess, the more specific your collection plan, and you gain even greater precision when refining collection priorities. The Division focused upon this portion.

The IPB process is many things to many people. BCTP actually considers it the be-all-and-end-all of the intelligence process. In fact, it is no more than a tool to ensure that the commander, his staff and his subordinate commanders all share a common view of the battlefield. It methodically examines the terrain, the enemy, probable enemy objectives and the resulting probable courses of action. It is interactive and dynamic. The process continues throughout battles and campaigns, factoring in additional information and new developments as they are available.

IPB is often viewed as being over when the much-vaunted decision support template (DST) is completed. This too is widely held to be more than it actually is. The DST is, in effect, the contract by which the commander and his staff agree to the basic shape of the intelligence plan as it supports the commander's intent. All other work proceeds from the DST. It has identified the key terrain, avenues of approach, named and target areas of interest, decision points, engagement areas and general areas of responsibility. But, we must remember that the DST is a snapshot view that must be constantly reviewed and updated to remain valid.

G2 Workstation reinforces the value of IPB by rewarding collection management that uses DSTs and all the other IPB tools appropriately. If a brigade S2 determines that a particular formation should be at a named area of interest at a certain time and then tasks the appropriate asset, he will be rewarded with the information he is seeking. Conversely, any error in application of the templating, timing or requesting and asset assignment process will yield either no information or, worse, misleading information. Repeated negative reports encourage a real "back-to-basics" review of procedures that has real-world advantages.

The Collection Management and Dissemination System is the essence of the entire intelligence system. From national level down to the lowest strategic or tactical collectors, the entire system is regulated and controlled through the prioritization and coordination mechanisms of the collection management process. Accordingly, the collection management process is at the heart of the G2 Workstation. The resulting exercise places less emphasis on arriving at the "correct answer" and instead places the emphasis correctly on how the collection assets are tasked and the information passed on to arrive at a "timely answer."

If, for instance, a brigade S2 convinces the G2 to divert limited collection resources to coverage of a critical but close-in target of key concern to the brigade there is a specific game response. As in the real world, the diverted asset will not be able to collect "deeper" out in the 24-48 hour depth where divisional planning and decision making is accomplished. It is precisely at this "depth" in time where potential critical shortages of personnel or combat power in the brigade area can be forecasted and responded to.

The physical mechanism the computer uses to accomplish the above example works as follows: The collection plan outlining times and areas of coverage is reported. The computer then applies the footprint of coverage that could be expected. Within that footprint are radars, radios, multichannel systems, moving vehicles, photo intelligence and HUMINT reports, etc. In other words, while the computer is loaded with output reflecting virtually every physical aspect of the battlefield, you will only receive data relative to your selection of system, location, time and specific tasking.

Two general results tend to occur. Either you receive a small amount of conflicting or confusing data that results from tasking errors, or you receive a flood of data that challenges your ability to collate and disseminate it while also dealing with future requirements. These two related results force the G2, the brigades and separate battalions, and the MI battalion to get specific in tasking assets, which means getting specific in the stating of requirements.

Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) that ask if the enemy will attack, and if so, where and in what strength essentially fail to specify either the commander's priority or the specific elements of information that are required.

As the exercise progressed the collection plan became a living document. It became interactive between brigade, the G2 and the battalion operating together to refine and optimize the taskings. The PIR began to look more like the following example:

Will lead elements of the 4th Guards Reconnaissance Regiment (27th Guards Battalion and 17th Armor Battalion) attack in company columns through the Bergwald pass (NAI #713A) between 172400A NOV 88 and 180300Z NOV 88 in direction of Landsberg (AA Blue)?

Now the collection manager at division, as well as everyone else in the tasking and execution cycle, understands the requirements and can focus on how to best satisfy them. All of the efforts focus on the commander's intent to forecast the beginning of the attack and discriminate between the main attack, supporting attacks, recons and feints.



All of the above occurs as the intelligence battalion works in parallel to develop courses of action that satisfy the mission requirements and commander's intent. Upon completion of the initial collection planning sequence the battalion's proposed concept of support is reviewed to ensure sufficient coverage in agreement with the G2 collection plan that now reflects a prioritized view of the entire division's requirements. This final review results in the actual tasking to company teams, including task organization and communication asset priorities.

The 107th put a great deal of effort into the internal planning process within the battalion. The staff developed courses of action and then presented them to the battalion and company commanders for review and discussion. The course of action that increased the MI systems abilities and best addressed the PIR/IR were chosen and an operational concept developed. The company commanders took the assigned task organization and conducted their own planning to include route selection, movement planning, site selection, communications profiles, supplementary positions and support considerations. They then back-briefed the battalion commander and staff and final adjustments were made to the plan before it was presented to the computer. Thus, the Workstation provided essential staff planning opportunities across the entire battalion as well as the whole divisional intelligence structure.

This level of detail and the interactive development and resolution of this view of the battlefield is at least half of the challenge to the intelligence system. The other half of this intelligence challenge might well be dissemination of the product to commanders and operators in a timely manner and in a usable form. This portion of the intelligence cycle can also be practiced by the Workstation Exercise. This particular event did not focus on that aspect of the cycle. That will be a key training goal of the division's next Workstation Exercise.

To those of us in the field who sometimes wonder aloud what the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School is doing for the field, one of the answers is emphatically, G2 Workstation! It is a good tool for training young officers. It is a great tool for training unit's without the high cost of a division or corps FTX. Good work Huachuca and thanks!

Major Jack Spencer is currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in reconnaissance, Airborne, Light Infantry and Cavalry assignments in Vietnam, Italy, Germany and CONUS. His staff assignments have included MI Battalion S3, HUMINT Officer VII Corps and G3 Plans Officer at 7th Infantry Division (Light).

RUCKMARCH!

by Second Lieutenant Vaughn Laganosky

We are training and developing the 21st century officer leaders of the Military Intelligence Corps at USAICS today. The academic departments and the 111th MI Brigade form the training and education team responsible for nurturing these future battlefield leaders. The new second lieutenants entering our Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) today will lead our Corps into the 21st century.

The USAICS team is charged with teaching many tactical and technical skills to these young officers. I have crystalized these numerous skills into this mission statement: "To train physically, emotionally, intellectually and spiritually tough lieutenants who are tactically and technically proficient and who are prepared for the leadership and warfighting challenges of the AirLand Battlefield."

The following article by Second Lieutenant Vaughn Laganosky addresses our ruckmarch training. That training is but one small but important methodology to aid us in accomplishing our mission.

Colonel Joseph M. Blair III
Commander 111th Military Intelligence Brigade (Training)

About four years ago, the cadre at MIOBC noticed a problem with excessive leg and ankle injuries happening during Tactical Proficiency Week (TPW). TPW required continuous tactical movement over rugged terrain under limited visibility. To prevent these injuries MIOBC classes began doing ruckmarches to condition the lower body and familiarize the student with movement in rugged terrain. Over the years, the ruckmarches have developed from a few short marches to a comprehensive program of physical training and leadership development. The program is based on input from the master fitness trainer, cadre experience, similiar programs at other schools, FM

21-20 *Physical Fitness Training* and FM 21-18 *Foot Marches.*

The soldiers march on hard surface roads, unimproved roads and cross country terrain. The first march is a short 3.5 mile shakedown to initiate the students to the training. It begins with an equipment inspection, proceeds into a moderately paced march along an improved road, then concludes with an after-action review in which all class members participate. The primary focus for the first ten weeks is on physical fitness. Each successive ruckmarch increases in difficulty with two 10-mile marches conducted in week 10. The combination of the physical fitness program and ruckmarches prepares the students for TPW. Following TPW (week 12) the primary focus changes to tactics and small unit leadership. The marches become missions and are conducted tactically.

When ruckmarches are done correctly they can indeed be physically demanding, but how do we develop officer leadership through ruckmarching? We do it by allowing the class leaders to assign all duties and responsibilities to the class members. The class leader is responsible for the preparation, execution and after-action review for each training event. The class S3 must coordinate for training areas, routes and assist with the operation order (OPORD). The S4 must schedule for weapons, radios and a safety vehicle. The assistant class leader and squad leaders must control their troops by enforcing standards and monitoring the health and welfare of their classmates. Time management becomes extremely important as the students must make all preparations during their personal time.

The entire schedule is tough and challenging and has proved a successful part of the physical fitness program. Individual lieutenants realize those who cannot meet the standard could quickly lose credibility as leaders. As part of the leadership development program the marches have proved invaluable.

Second Lieutenant Vaughn Laganosky enlisted in 1982 and attended one station unit training at Fort Benning, Ga. He was assigned to 2d Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger) as a mortarman and forward observer and 389th MI Company (CEWI), 11th Special Forces Group as S.O.T. "B" team leader. Laganosky was commissioned from the Univ. of Louisville in 1987. He is presently assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

The Systems Approach to Training

by Carolyn E. Saunders

There's an old Chinese proverb that says the more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in war. For today's Army, training is a 24-hour job. Combat readiness demands tough, challenging training. And as leaders, officers and noncommissioned officers must ensure that all soldiers are combat ready. Thus, for the Army, training is not relegated to the "schoolhouse." It is a matter that concerns all soldiers.

We must train the way we intend to fight. Our historical experiences amply show the correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield. As Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force*, tells us, the highest quality training is essential at all levels. That is why the tasks we train our soldiers to do cannot be selected at random, or selected because someone "thinks" that is what should be taught. Instead, we must systematically implement training with a battle focus. In the units we do this by using the training management cycle; in the schoolhouse we do this by using a systems approach to training (SAT). The system approach to training is the application of the processes of evaluation, analysis, design, development and implementation to determine the who, what, where, when, why and how of training. SAT applies to all training materials for which TRADOC has a training proponency responsibility.

Since every soldier is involved in a systematic approach to training, either directly or indirectly, perhaps an understanding of why Army training is based on a systems approach would clarify how this can be a useful tool at all levels of training.

The Army was "out front" in adoping a systems approach to training. Training 20 years ago was often a series of lectures in which "instructors told trainees what they thought trainees ought to know, often providing content that was completely irrelevant to job performance."[1]

However, as a result of advances in instructional technology, it has become possible to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our instruction. We can use analysis to determine what students really need to know. We can "prescribe desired outcomes with enough precision to allow selection of the most appropriate....methods and media to achieve these outcomes. In addition, it is possible through evaluation to determine whether the outcomes were worth achieving. It is interesting to note that these advances in instructional technology have had the most profound influence on....business, industrial and military sectors, settings where the consequences of good and poor performance are immediately significant."[2]

Our first question should be, "So why a systems approach to training; what was wrong with the old fashioned, traditional approach?" Some interesting criticisms are often heard about traditional training programs. They include such points as:

* Only a small percentage of students (typically 10 percent or so) become highly proficient. Most remain only minimally competent.
* Heavy reliance on lectures (sometimes several hours long) as a teaching method leads to student dissatisfaction, absenteeism and discipline problems.
* Employers can't tell from transcripts and course titles exactly what successful graduates can actually do.
* Theory, memorization of facts and terms, nice-to-know knowledge and background information are over-emphasized, without enough emphasis on learning how to actually perform on the job.[3]

These criticisms have been made about training in general, but you can probably associate at least one of them with specific military training you've received. In an effort to avoid these kinds of criticism and to make military training as effective and efficient as possible, the Department of Defense contacted universities and



THE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

industry for ideas in applying a systems approach to the development of training for the military.

The origins of the systems approach are interesting. It evolved from problem solving techniques used during World War II when, for example, the Allies had to:

* Quickly identify the elements of a problem (ships are being sunk in the Atlantic);
* Gather data about the problem (too many effective enemy submarines—especially at certain times and places);
* Choose the best solution (get more destroyers around the convoys and also change the routing and scheduling of ships). It was determined that the majority of attacks occurred at only a few locations at specific times of day on unprotected vessels.
* Develop and implement the solution (change the routes and schedules to reduce vessel visi-

bility and also build and deploy additional destroyers to protect the convoys.)[4]

As you can see from this example, thinking in systems terms helps us to define a problem and analyze it in order to identify possible solutions. It helps us to select, develop and implement what appears to be the best solution. Finally, it helps us to evaluate the effectiveness of the chosen solution and to rethink our choice if necessary.[5]

This approach to problem solving is reflected in the intelligence cycle. The problem definition comes from the mission, while analysis is linked to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process. During collecting and processing we select and synthesize solutions. Implementation and evaluation occur as a result of dissemination and use of the intelligence products and after-action review.

This, then, is the systems approach to problem solving. It is really a decision support system which helps the decision maker under conditions of uncertainty. How does this apply to the training and training developments environment? Just as the systems approach to problem solving originated with the military, so did the systems approach to training.

As weapons systems became more complex and required more highly trained personnel, the armed services sought new procedures for developing and delivering training. Drawing on concepts from general systems theory as well as from information science, communication, learning theory and other fields, a variety of systems models was created. However, all models contained three fundamental steps: defining needs; stating instructional objectives; and developing, evaluating, and implementing the instruction. The model adopted by the Army is what we know as SAT.[6] Key virtues of SAT include the way it encourages a broader perspective and encourages us to validate the training we develop.

Still, what is the difference between conventionally designed instruction and systematically designed instruction? Conventional training draws heavily on the expertise of the trainer within the content area. More often than not, the instruction evolves from the intuition and creativity of the trainer, rather than matching the job requirements. The focus is more on content than on student performance.

On the other hand, systematically designed instruction or training focuses on stating in advance the performance to be demonstrated by the students. It is usually related to-

* matching job requirements with learners' needs,
* formulation of objectives,
* clustering related objectives into unified learning strategies,
* using a mix of media,
* including alternative instructional solutions,
* conducting tryouts to review the effectiveness of the instructional design, and
* assessing the extent to which students attain the objectives.[7]

The need for systematically developed training continues today with the military remaining a significant force in the evolution of instructional technology. As military budget cuts continue, we must ensure the taxpayer gets the best return for each dollar spent—including the training dollar. We need to efficiently train individuals in a wide range of skills from operating and maintaining complex electronic equipment to performing clerical tasks. We need to clearly state training objectives and then train to meet those objectives. SAT, with its process of analysis, design and evaluation, provides a degree of assurance that these training needs are being met in the most efficient manner possible.[8]

In order to develop training products for either unit or resident training, we follow a five step process. The first step in the process, analysis, determines what needs to be trained. Major products at this stage are critical task lists and job and task analysis worksheets. While these products are produced at a TRADOC school, soldiers in the field are instrumental in successful completion of the analysis phase. You are asked, usually via a survey, to identify the tasks you actually perform on the job. It is only through correct identification of these tasks that training can be developed which will produce soldiers trained to do the job!

Analysis is probably the most important phase for any training, whether we are developing it for the school through SAT or for the unit through the training management plan. In the unit, it is through the commander's analysis of war plans and external directives that he identifies the tasks essential to accomplishing the unit's wartime mission. While the cost of such front-end analysis may be relatively high, the cost of not precisely identifying what needs to be trained, in terms of human lives on the battlefield, is even higher.

Then the products of the analysis phase feed into the second phase of SAT design. At this point, training developers determine the best way to train and what the students should be able to do when they complete the training. Key products include learning analysis worksheets, learning objectives, learning activities, methods/media, test items (including Soldier's Qualification Tests), course sequence, training management plans and programs of instruction.

The next phase, development, involves putting together the training materials. Products are lesson plans, soldiers' manuals, Military Qualification Standards manuals, Training Extension Course (TEC) lessons, Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) lessons, scripts for audiovisual products and performance guides. These materials also undergo validation in this phase.

During the fourth phase, implementation, we conduct the actual training in residence or at the unit through TEC and ACCP lessons. This process entails training the trainers, preparing for training, conducting training and maintaining soldier training records.

Finally, evaluation determines what went right and what went wrong with the training. Internal review monitors the training program throughout design, development and implementation; external review looks at results of training and recommends fixes. It is evaluation, in fact, which triggers the entire SAT process. When evaluation tells us field performance is not at the level required, we must perform needs assessment to determine if this is a result of a shortfall in equipment, doctrine, force structure or training. If the answer is training, then we must begin the analysis process again to determine what to train, and the cycle repeats itself.

How does the soldier in the unit actually apply SAT? If you have been tasked to provide training for your squad or platoon and there are no schoolhouse-produced training materials available, you are advised by Field Manual 25-3, *Training in Units*, to follow the Five-P Model. The five Ps, planning, preparing, presenting, practicing and performing, closely parallel the five steps in the SAT process.

During planning you must perform some type of needs assessment and analysis to determine what needs to be trained. Design occurs during planning as you write training objectives and select the method of presentation. While preparing, the design process continues as you identify soldiers or units to be trained. You also move into development as you prepare the equipment, facilities and materials. Presenting and practicing coincide with implementation, while the final P, performing, is the equivalent to the evaluation phase of SAT.

But even with SAT built into so much of our training, resistance to the systems approach to training remains. Perhaps this is because the consequence of applying a systems approach to training is change. TRADOC is the agent for management of change in Army training. Many people in training development are often uncomfortable with the SAT model itself, since the application of the model might well require them to change their way of doing business. This leads to "fear and loathing" of the model. The question, then, becomes one for the NCOs and the officers—the leaders—in the Army. Will we enthusiastically implement a method of training development that will produce soldiers who are combat ready? This is necessary if we're going to win on the modern battlefield with the best trained soldiers we can produce. Can we afford to accept the alternative to a systematic approach to training—a nonsystematic approach to training?

Footnotes

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2. Ibid, p. vi.
3. William E. Blank, **Handbook for Developing Competency-Based Training Programs** (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), pp. 9-10.
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6. Knirk and Gustafson, p. 3.
7. Elba C. Grovdahl and Robert R. Lange, "Which is it? Conventionally or Systematically Designed Instruction or...," ***Performance and Instruction***, February 1989, p. 32.
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Only One Party in the Barracks: The Training of Soviet Conscripts

by Chief Warrant Officer Three Keith D. Martin

The Soviet soldier's training differs radically from the training received by his U.S. counterpart. I do not wish to depict the Soviets as being incapable of fighting or, much more importantly, of defending the Soviet Union. What I hope to do is help you understand something about the individual Soviet rifleman, tanker or cannoneer.

The Soviet private is a conscript inducted under the Universal Law of Military Conscription (as modified in 1977) for a period of two or three years depending on the service into which he is inducted. At the time of induction, he is uniquely a product of Soviet society. I would like to say that this means that he has been taught to conform since childhood, and that he accepts his conscription with a certain oriental fatalism. While at one time this might have been true, the influence of the West can now be seen on the conscript. Most conscripts who have not been preselected for specialized or noncommissioned officer training, are at best apathetic towards military training. Service is often viewed as a step that must be completed prior to receiving the work permit required for civilian employment. Others look at their conscription as a loss of motorcycles, possessions and rock music, which have become more and more common, especially among teenagers in the larger cities. Finally, there is the fact that they will be forced into an existence that they neither understand or, in some cases, can even anticipate.

Until recently, the average Soviet conscript could expect to be sent directly to his unit of assignment where he would spend his entire term of service. There were no true specialized "basic training" facilities for ordinary conscripts. This has now changed somewhat with the creation of initial training units in each military district and group of forces. These units also serve to isolate the new conscript from his greatest nemesis, the senior conscript.

Regardless of whether he receives training at a training unit or with his unit of assignment, the conscript quickly comes in contact with the unit conscript chain of command. This is a chain which in most units parallels the officer/NCO chain. This is often where the real authority lies within the unit. As one of the "scum" (first-term conscripts), the new soldier can expect to have his uniforms stolen, to receive the poorest and least food, to perform the most and hardest manual labor, and, too often, be forced to submit to sex by second, third or fourth-term conscripts. The mental and physical abuse fostered on the conscript does little to motivate the individual and often only serves to further alienate the conscript from the military.

From the day U.S. soldiers enter the Army, they are encouraged to identify with their buddies, their squad, their platoon and their company. They are given an understanding of how the Army functions, and how it interacts with the other services. The Soviet conscript receives no such indoctrination. His loyalty is sworn to the state, and his identity with his unit seldom extends beyond his individual platoon or subunit. Possibly because so much of his service is a matter of survival or because of his apathetic attitude, it is not uncommon for a released conscript to not know his parent regiment, brigade or division. He is, more often than not, totally unaware of his surroundings and may not even be able to specifically identify his unit's garrison location.

Training within units is normally cyclic and repetitious. The training cycle begins each spring and fall with the arrival of the new conscripts. It ends with the release of conscripts who have completed their service obligation. It starts with basic military training and progresses through squad, platoon, company, battalion and regimental operations. The cycle usually ends with a major exercise. While this type of training

ensures adherence to established norms, it allows for little variety in routine. By the time a conscript has served two years, he has completed four cycles and can perform the required maneuvers without thinking. He can react without question in given situations, but he is ill-prepared to deal with situations outside the scope of his experience. He is normally bored and has little to look forward to except the completion of service.

The workday is long and recreation facilities scarce in the Soviet armed forces. Conscripts have little to look forward to at the end of the day except a few relaxing moments in the barracks. Soldiers are normally not allowed out of garrison during the duty week, and pay is so low for a conscript private (3 rubles, 18 kopecks per month, about $5.41), that often the only option appears to be the purchase of illegal vodka or, more recently, drugs.

By his final term of conscription, the conscript has usually become part of the unit's internal, albeit unofficial, chain of command. He does very little work, receives the pick of uniforms and food, and often feels secure enough to challenge the NCO chain of command. In some units these conscripts form into groups that routinely use intimidation against their noncommissioned officers to escape training. Where this does not occur it is probably safe to say that the soldiers are simply going through the motions, behaving in many ways like combat soldiers who have been assigned to a unit to wait out their last few months in a noncombat status. The conscript is looking toward the end of his commitment and his release.

Make no mistake, the Soviet soldier trains hard and long, and endures conditions that would probably overwhelm all but the toughest of his Western counterparts. He is by no means weak, a fact that he has proven over and over again. He suffers more from his system than from his own inadequacies. While he is well trained within his norms, he is prone to view training as something to be endured rather than something to prepare him for the future. How much this will impact on his combat performance can only be judged in a true combat situation. We should not allow systematic problems with the Soviet conscription and training system to lead us to believe that the Soviet soldier won't or can't fight. Regardless of the training mechanism, given the proper motivation, Soviet troops can perform very effectively. They have repeatedly proven that they will fight extremely hard when they are convinced that the cause for which they are fighting is just.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Keith D. Martin entered active service in 1967. He has served as an Intelligence Analyst as well as an Intelligence Collector. Martin is a graduate of the Univ. of California and has a master's degree from the Defense Intelligence College. He is one of the contributing authors to the article, "Gorbachev's Troop Withdrawals: Improved Combat Capability in Disguise," that will appear in the January-March 1990 issue of ***Military Intelligence.***

Soviet NBC Training: Strategy for Victory

by Lieutenant Colonel Norman A. Hoffman

The Soviets believe that chemical agents add to the lethality of future warfare and are capable of creating widespread shock and stress. Soviet military journals describe the effects of the potential employment of NATO weapons as severely disrupting combat operations.

NATO armies have large stockpiles of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. The first strike will result in enormous areas being contaminated. Troops will be forced to fight under difficult conditions for a lengthy time, with the constant and real danger of casualties from radioactive substances, toxic chemical agents or biological agents.[1]

The intensity of Soviet interest in chemical defence is not new. This is hardly surprising given the fact that in World War I the Imperial Russian Army sustained some 475,000 gas casualties, including 56,000 deaths.[2]

Chemical warfare gains importance because the Soviet strategy for victory depends on achieving surprise and seizing and maintaining momentum. The employment of chemical munitions becomes one of a number of "triggers" used to gain the vital element of surprise. As a result of surprise and decisive offensive operations, the Soviets believe the enemy's capabilities will be sharply lowered and the ratio of forces will change immediately.[3]

Chemical warfare poses specific problems to combat effectiveness. The sudden employment of toxic agents has tremendous shock value. The persistence of agents and the difficulty to defend against them also add to the effect on morale and ability to fight.[4] Primarily, however, the creation of casualties is immediate and is severely disruptive.

In situations where the employment of chemical munitions is likely, fear of their employment may cause a reduction in the fighting ability of individuals and units. Soviet leaders feel that this fear must be dealt with in their own troops. However, it is an opportunity for exploitation with enemy forces.[5]

The experience of British, German, American and Soviet forces highlights the fact that the use of chemical agents has historically influenced the will of soldiers to continue fighting. Richard Holmes, in his book, **Acts of War, The Behavior of Men in Battle**, quotes Georg Zobel, who observed the carnage left after a British chemical attack at St. Quentin and made these remarks: "Here and there were men from other units who had been surprised by the gas. They sat or lay and vomited pieces of their corroded lungs. Horrible this death! And, much as they implored us, nobody dared to give them the *coup de grace*. We were badly shaken by it all."[6]

"Chemical warfare gains importance because the Soviet strategy for victory depends on achieving surprise and seizing and maintaining momentum."

Zobel's words underscore the impact of chemical warfare on the individual soldier and the difficulty of motivation in a lethal environment. The Soviets plan to overcome this problem with a combination of psychological and political preparation. Their ideal soldier will be motivated and conditioned to fight in any environment. He will have trained under realistic battlefield conditions and gained confidence in his equipment by extensive use. He will be able to survive and maintain combat effectiveness under chemical attack. Further, he will be capable of sustaining combat and achieving victory. The development of physical and mental endurance in soldiers is critical for survival in such an environment because in the Soviet view, "actions under such conditions are difficult....and require high morale and great physical exertion."[7]

The shock effect of chemical warfare was noted by the German Army in World War II. Herman Ochsner was quoted as saying that "...the more important effect of chemical warfare agents is their (effect on morale). The opinion held in German circles is that their demoralizing effect is greater than that of any other arm or means of combat..."[8]

A U.S. evaluation is that, "the shock effect at the tactical level will diminish with each subsequent attack," however, the initial effect is profound![9] The anticipation itself causes tension and forces protective measures to be taken as a precaution. These measures tend to slow and disrupt the tempo of battle.

The Soviets put a high priority on NBC defence operations. This is demonstrated by the high number of personnel that are assigned to their chemical units and the extensive use of chemical play in tactical and combined-arms exercises. It is also reflected in the many articles on the subject in their military press.

The Soviet Union maintains a massive chemical establishment which includes over 85,000 specialized chemical troops, a wide variety of defensive equipment, and a broad range of modern chemical weapons. These capabilities have been finely tuned through numerous large-scale exercises.[10]

Soviet training stresses that fear and inactiveness under chemical attack can be overcome by developing soldiers' trust in their protective equipment and the effectiveness of NBC training. This confidence in equipment is developed by repetitive and sustained use.[11]

Under recent Soviet policies of openness and self-criticism, military articles have described chemical training shortfalls. It appears



that Soviet commanders do not always meet the training standards or proficiency levels prescribed by the Army's leadership. Specialized tactical exercises and training do not always contain combined arms problems. In a number of cases, they occur in simplified circumstances, when chemical warfare troops only occasionally carry out their special missions and, in actuality, are not seriously tested by enemy resistance.[12]

Wearing chemical defensive gear tends to reduce battlefield efficiency because it isolates soldiers. The ability to speak and be heard is reduced. Fears of meeting the enemy threat are compounded as the close support and cohesion of groups is broken down by the limitations of the gear. Team members are hard to recognize and communication becomes more difficult. There is a clear connection between these problems and the loss of the will to fight in a chemical environment.

U.S. studies have shown that since the hands, as well as all other exposed skin, must be covered with protective fabric, the operation of small tools, weapons, switches, keyboards, etc. is made more difficult. Vision is impaired. Simple tasks become difficult. Men tire quickly. Not only direct combat functions, but also support tasks are degraded as protected men and units struggle to move supplies, repair equipment and service weapons systems.[13]

The U.S. tests were done under controlled conditions. In the adverse situations of tension, confusion and fear on the battlefield, effective performance would be further reduced.

"Wearing chemical defensive gear tends to reduce battlefield efficiency because it isolates soldiers."

The Soviets believe that the increased battle stress, isolation, greater fatigue and the loss of ability to accomplish combat tasks are trade-offs for using the current Soviet (and U.S.) chemical attire. They attempt to instill physical and mental endurance in their soldiers to increase their chances for survival and ensure that units will continue to be effective under chemical attack. Their commitment not to be caught unprepared is backed-up by extensive preparation for survival in a chemical environment. They have addressed the training of the individual soldier so that he becomes confident of his equipment and is psychologically prepared for the stresses of sustained chemical operations. Only time will tell how effective this preparation is. The Soviet goal is to ensure the reliability of the individual soldier as a combatant who can survive any battlefield environment, who can press forward at any cost, and who can seize the initiative and maintain the offensive until victory is assured.

Footnotes

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3. V. Ye. Savkin, **The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (Soviet View)**, translated under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 232-233.
4. Captain Henery Wolski, "Threat on the Battlefield and Its Effects," as described by Dr. Harold S. Orenstein, Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
5. Wolski, loc. cit.
6. Richard Holmes, **Acts of War, the Behavior of Men in Battle**, p.188.
7. Shubin, op cit.
8. Hugh Stringer, *Deterring Chemical Warfare: U.S. Policy Options for the 1990s*, p. 7.
9. Ibid, p. 8.
10. Ibid, p. viii.
11. V. V. Shelyag, A. D. Glotochkin, K. K. Platonov, *Military Psychology: A Soviet View*, p. 401.
12. Col. V. Krasnov, ***Special Tactical Exercises—A Trend in Combined Arms Combat***, Soviet Press Selected Translations, p. 204.
13. Stringer, op cit, p. vi.

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Something New in MIOBC

by Captain Douglas W. Hocking

There is something new in the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course. The focus is the Command Estimate Process. The goal is to produce better intelligence staff officers with a clearer understanding of their role in providing timely intelligence to the commander. Recognizing that students needed a better understanding of how intelligence supports and drives tactical operations, the Department of Tactics, Intelligence and Military Science developed a plan to base tactical intelligence training around the Command Estimate Process.

The five-week block of instruction on tactics and tactical intelligence is team-taught by a combat arms officer and an intelligence officer. Teaming the combat arms intelligence user with the intelligence producer gives the basic course student a better perspective on how products are used and interpreted. Students work through the estimate process in one scenario for a brigade defense and a second scenario for a task force offensive operation. Final integration takes place in the field during a war exercise when students role-play as part of brigade and task force staffs and an MI battalion technical control and analysis element.

Instruction focuses on Airland Battle Doctrine and on how each system is integrated within the command estimate. Instruction begins by presenting the organization, missions and capabilities of the battlefield operating systems: maneuver battalions (to include scouts and mortars), engineers, field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation and the Air Force. Students are also taught how to task organize brigades and battalions.

The students work in three- or four-man planning cells and are "assigned" to a brigade preparing to defend a sector in the Fulda Gap. Given a Division Order and overlay and instruction on mission analysis, students analyze their brigade's mission and produce a restated mission that becomes the basis of all further planning. The students then begin the IPB process. Each of the five functions of the IPB process is taught in detail and a practical exercise is conducted for each one. **All** IPB products derived from the practical exercises are used in the same scenario. Students learn to analyze the areas of operations and interest, analyze terrain and the enemy, and write the intelligence estimate. They learn reconnaissance and surveillance planning and produce modified combined obstacle overlays and situational templates. In this way, they develop the tools required to produce the feasible courses of action presented in a decision brief to the "commander." One course of action is selected for development into a Defensive Operations Order. This course of action is wargamed against the most probable enemy course of action to produce a decision support template. In instruction and practical exercise, students have worked from receipt of higher headquarters' operations order, through mission analysis and the entire Command Estimate/course of action development process to presenting a decision briefing and developing their own operations order.

In the next phase, processing, the students "fight" the battle they've planned. Since all intelligence products have been related to a single scenario and to the staff that will use them, the students get to see how their intelligence products relate to the command estimate.

The multiple choice defense examination is based on the analysis of a brigade operations order. Students have a division order for the defense and must answer questions resulting from mission analysis. They use situational templates and other IPB products to analyze shortcomings in an intelligence estimate, decision support template, and reconnaissance and surveillance plan. They then perform the course of action development including analyzing relative combat power and allocating forces. This very difficult examination sets a high standard for the student officers.

Up to this point all products and processes have been related to the defense and to a brigade staff. The entire process is repeated for the offense, this time in a battalion staff environment. Students are "assigned" to the staff of a battalion that is part of a brigade about to launch the division's counterattack.

After receiving the brigade's operations order for the counterattack, the students spend the next week in their battalion cells planning an offensive mission. They repeat the entire Command Estimate Process beginning with mission analysis and ending with a task force offensive operations order and decision support template. They then wargame the battle they have planned

in a processing exercise.

The final examination is "hands on." Students write an intelligence estimate, produce situational templates, a decision support template, and a reconnaissance and surveillance plan. They also write paragraphs 2 and 3 of a Task Force Offensive Operations Order and produce a Task Organization and Operations Overlay.

The entire process ends in a five-day command post war exercise. The students are broken down into a brigade staff, two task force staffs and an MI battalion technical control and analysis element. Instructors assign students to staff positions which are rotated after each battle. Ft. Huachuca is the area of interest and operations. The students do a recon of the area prior to developing their modified combined obstacle overlay and intelligence estimate. This gives them hands-on experience with real terrain and a comparison between map and ground recon. Day and night, the students fight through a low intensity conflict and transition to fight six engagements in a mid-intensity environment. Before each engagement the brigade staff briefs a senior intelligence officer, usually an USAICS 05 or 06, on their plan.

Free play on each battle lasts three hours. The key elements taught are staff coordination and the use of the decision support template. A properly developed decision support template and good processing leads to successful counterattacks. A successfully coordinated and executed SEAD program leads to successful close air support and attack helicopter missions.

Students gain a much greater insight into their role as tactical intelligence staff officers and a greater understanding of what is required in the planning process. The Command Estimate Process provides the tool for teaching and training officers better equipped for today's Army.

Captain Douglas W. Hocking served with the Army Security Agency as an enlisted soldier from 1968 to 1972. He served in the Army Reserve from 1977 to 1981 as an interrogator in the 277 MID. He is a distinguished graduate of the 6ITAAS IPW course and the OPFOR Europe, Operations and Intelligence course. He branched Armor out of ROTC (Arizona State Univ.) in 1981. From 1981 to 1984 he served with 2/6 Cavalry as a tank platoon leader, support platoon leader and as executive officer of the OPFOR Troop of the Armor Center and School. From 1985 to 1988 he served with the 2/11 Armored Cavalry Regiment (Bad Kissigen, FRG) as S1 and HHT commander, and for more than 18 months as the S2. Currently he is an instructor/writer with the Department of Tactics, Intelligence and Military Science, USAICS.

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WRITER'S GUIDE

We encourage our readers to submit articles for publication. Please type your manuscripts double spaced. The staff reserves the right to edit material as necessary, and if you intend to submit the same article to another publication, you must let us know in advance. Follow the guidelines described in the Effective Writing for Army Leaders, DA Pamphlet 600-67:

- Put your bottom line up front.
- Use the active voice.
- Use short sentences (an average of 15 or fewer words).
- Develop your ideas into short paragraphs.
- Use "I", "you", and "we" as subjects of sentences when it makes sense to do so.

A Good Juggling Act

by Captain Bradford K. Nelson

You have to be a good juggler to be a successful officer. What does juggling have to do with anything, except maybe the circus? My ROTC instructor told me that, as an officer, I would have to juggle glass balls and rubber balls. Glass balls and rubber balls are very different and have to be handled certain ways.

Some Bounce, Some Break

Rubber balls bounce. They can be dropped. They can even be thrown without damage. Rubber balls are usually cheap. You can lose a rubber ball and replace it at no great expense.

Glass balls are fragile. If they are dropped, they shatter into a thousand pieces. You definitely can't throw them. They are usually expensive and not easily replaced. My ROTC instructor warned me, "Beware of glass balls."

Disguise

What does juggling glass and rubber balls have to do with being a good officer? You may think that you've never even seen a glass or rubber ball, let alone juggled one. The balls are there. They were at your old unit, they will be there at your next one. They are disguised to look like memos, messages and letters. They come from phone calls, notes from the boss, notes from the staff, notes in distribution, the source is endless. Many of these disguised balls appear only as little yellow notes. All notes are not created equal. Like balls, some are glass and some are rubber.

Many people handle these notes as if they were all made of rubber. They are unaware of the fragile glass ones in disguise. Some people stick these notes all over their office, like demented interior decorators. Some try and hide them in a bottomless "in-basket." Still others merely shuffle them from one place on their desk to another. The rubber ones can survive this rough treatment, but, by-and-by, the glass ones get dropped and break. When the glass ones break, they can make quite a mess.

A glass ball might be a memo that says, "Be at the meeting next week at 0900. Be prepared to brief your training plan." or "LEC will inspect your arms room next Friday at 0730. Make sure everything is ready. We can't fail this one." A rubber ball might look like, "Review the staff study by the S4 on The Availability of Paper Clips and make comments."

We all know someone (perhaps ourselves) who claims to have lost half of their "posterior region" after a sudden, violent encounter with their boss.

Most often what happens is that they have sat on a glass ball that had been hiding in their office. The glass ball was hidden among a bunch of rubber ones and was not found until it was too late. All that remains is broken glass and a bloody mess. The rest is stitches and history.

No Pain

I have used a method that is not perfect but has saved me a lot of pain and broken glass. It may take a little extra time at first and it requires discipline. It is, however, much better and less painful than picking glass splinters out of private places. All it requires is a convenient notebook, sometimes called a "daily planner," that can be found in stationery stores, through mail order or you may be able to find one through Army supply. The notebook should have three important sections: a page for each day with a place to make notes and schedule daily events, a set of monthly calendars showing a month at a time, and a phone directory. It doesn't matter what kind of notebook it is. What matters is that it gets used.

The key to successfully using your notebook is to carry your notebook with you at all times. Important dates, times, names, questions, answers, projects etc., are all in one place—your notebook.

Each time you get a new memo, letter or even a little yellow note, read it.

*Determine if it is a glass ball or a rubber one.
*Make two entries in your notebook.
*Note the important facts (who, what, where, when, etc.), and write them down in your daily notes.
*If need be, write a follow-up date, due date, meeting date or just a reminder in your calendar section.
*Get rid of the note. Whatever you do, do not keep it unless absolutely necessary.

Sometimes you will get a note with a question.

*If you know the answer write it on the note and send it back.
*Write down this action in your notebook for future reference.
*If you don't know the answer, record the question, who will need the answer, and by when.

A phone call should be handled just like a note.

*Write down the important part of the message or conversation in the notebook.
*Do not create a little yellow note for yourself.

Occasionally you will get a document that you have to keep.

*Write the important points in the note book.
*Put the document in a short term file, clearly marked.
*Get rid of it as soon as you can.
*If you feel guilty about throwing stuff away, then find someone with a big filing cabinet and give it to him.

A good rule to follow is to only handle a piece of paper once if you can help it.

You are in Control

If you learn to prioritize and manage your time better, you are on the offense, no longer defending yourself against falling glass balls. Your notebook should now contain nearly everything you need to know about to "survive." The more organized you become then others will know that you won't drop the glass ball that they have entrusted to you.

Your notebook can also protect you. Occasionally a desperate person will try and pass you a glass ball just as it's about to shatter. He will try to make it your problem. He will not succeed if you open up your notebook and recite the date, time and conversation when the glass ball was passed to him. All he can do is run back to his office and try and find it before it breaks. The glass ball lurks in his office, not yours.

Most of the ideas I've shared with you have come from various time management seminars. There are many different seminars available, some on tape or in print and sometimes taught locally. Learning more about time management is time well-spent.

Captain Bradford K. Nelson graduated from the Univ. of Utah. He completed the MI Officer Basic Course, Airborne School and the MI Officer Advanced Course. He has served as the EW platoon leader A/109th MI Battalion (CEWI), S2 3-1 Infantry (CAB) H 9th Infantry Division (MTZ), Ops platoon leader/XO C/109th MI Battalion (CEWI), and detachment commander 90SD/109th MI Battalion (CEWI), Fort Lewis, Wash.

The Siege of San Rafael

by Michael G. Conrad

You may be surprised to learn that for a short period in the middle of July 1989, elements of the 7th Infantry Division (light) occupied the capital city of San Rafael Province in the tiny Latin American Republic of Monterey. Located in the division rear, Ciudad San Rafael was to be used as a staging area for the redeployment of U.S. forces when the battle was handed over to the Army of Monterey. The Montereyan forces would then continue to fight to the south, against military units of the invading Social Democratic Republic of Roberta, who were believed to be receiving assistance from San Rafael cells of the Free Monterey Forces, guerrillas and various other socialist countries (primarily in advisory roles). The 107th MI Battalion was assigned the mission of collecting and reporting threat information about the town and the immediate area (the threat was considered to be a phase one insurgency), as well as tactical intelligence concerning the main battle. The CI and IPW platoons of B Company were the primary sources for this collection effort; its success or failure would be a direct result of the quality and timeliness of the intelligence they were to gather. Tensions among the civilian population were running high, and the local authorities were beginning to lose their precarious grip on the situation...

BEEEEEEEEP

This was only a test of the Insurgency Forecasting System. Had it been an actual insurgency, though, the IPW and CI platoons of the 107th MI Battalion would have been ready for it. They know that now, because they've just completed an intensive evaluation of their training levels at Fort Ord, Calif.

The 107th's HUMINT ARTEP was a one-of-a-kind exercise designed "to replicate the conditions in which the CI and IPW platoons may have to operate during actual deployment to a low-intensity [conflict] scenario" and to "train and evaluate [them] in their abilities to execute missions from their METLs,"[1] according to ARTEP standards.

Human intelligence is considered to be the most difficult intelligence discipline to train and evaluate—to do it right often requires an extraordinary effort. The 107th decided it was worth the trouble. They established a Latin American-style town at the Fort Ord training sites set aside for Military Operations in Urban Terrain, peopling it with an ersatz local government and a population of potential HUMINT sources. The battalion staff worked out the details of support and administration, with the S3 shop taking the lead in developing a memorandum of instruction and a Master

Events List, which would drive the entire exercise. Augmentees from various reserve and National Guard units filled vacancies in the evaluated platoons, as well as providing role players for the town of San Rafael. Other role players came from B and C Companies, 4/17th Infantry Battalion, whose chain of command, naturally enough, functioned as the town hierarchy. Training of the role players began two weeks before the start of the exercise, while other support preparations were being completed. During this time, the interrogators and investigators were understandably prohibited from using their HUMINT skills to learn the details of the upcoming operation.

The exercise kicked off on July 23rd and lasted seven days, the first of which was devoted mostly to establishing the town and its occupational force and conducting introductory briefings.

The second day the ARTEP went full force. Walk-ins provided source material for the CI personnel, and various notional events (the Army's way of saying, "Let's not, and say we did") occurred, which served to aggravate the tense relations between the various factions in the town. Some of the highlights were the miner's strike and a couple of terrorist-style attacks.

CI and EPW activity increased markedly the following day, and the G2's cage began to fill up. A drug convoy was ambushed, and the candidate for the opposition party was assassinated in the barrio of San Miguelito. Meanwhile, more CI incidents occurred and numerous captured documents were taken to the division cage. Rumors flew concerning a riot that was supposed to take place the next day.

On Day Four, the riot did indeed break out, following the wake for the murdered opposition candidate. U.S. forces were called in for riot control. Two insurgents were captured, as well as a number of military PWs and a North Korean advisor. Fearing that things were getting out of hand, the local police declared martial law, which led to the day ending in a fight in the cantina over the newly imposed curfew.

The next day, all hell broke loose. Governor Santiago gave a speech in which he cited civil unrest and treachery from within the province as reasons for postponing the scheduled mayoral elections indefinitely. Before he could finish, the crowd went wild and stormed the Provincial Building. American infantry soldiers were called in once again, and managed to form a corridor through which the besieged government officials could escape the rioters.[2]

Cordon and search operations were ordered for the following day, in an attempt to find suspected guerrilla weapons and demolitions. The division cage was taken down and preparations were

made for the screening of refugees. This was the main focus of the final day's evaluation, as it provided the last opportunity to collect intelligence. The other main objective of the screening was to identify hostile intelligence personnel, insurgents, saboteurs, subversives and enemy infiltrators before they could pass through to the vulnerable division rear.

The evaluators gave the IPW Platoon a satisfactory rating, remarking on their improved ability to stay in concert with the commander's intent and focus on mission accomplishment. This enabled them to provide an outstanding assessment of the threat. However, the lack of training opportunities beyond these annual exercises has seriously hampered the platoon in mastering several key ARTEP tasks. Addressing these deficiencies will, of course, be the goal of future training and the identification of such deficiencies is what ARTEPs are all about in the first place.

The IPW Platoon was rated outstanding, having done a superb job of screening PWs and using all three foreign languages (Spanish, Russian and Korean) to good effect. The interrogators were hindered most by what appears to be a problem of doctrine, which will probably have to be resolved at the TRADOC level.

In the words of Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. Hayden, commander of the 107th MI Battalion, "The HUMINT ARTEP...was a superb training event. The detailed planning and preparation paid off in quality time for these difficult to train HUMINT skills. The feedback from the leadership, soldiers and support personnel at the hotwash was enthusiastic and highlighted how good training can turn on an organization."[3]

It just goes to show you what a little imagination—and a whole lot of hard work—can do.

Footnotes:

1. *Memorandum of Instruction for the 107th Military Intelligence Battalion HUMINT ARTEPs*, June 15, 1989, p. 1.
2. Excerpts from ***"El Heraldo,"*** newspaper created for Ciudad San Rafael by Second Lieutenant Daniel B. Bulsa, July 28, 1989, pp. 1-2.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. Hayden, *Evaluation Report of the 107th Military Intelligence Battalion (Light) HUMINT ARTEP, 223-29 Jul 89*, August 8, 1989, p. 1.

Michael G. Conrad is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy (class of 1980). As a Signal Officer, he was assigned to the 533rd Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) in Frankfurt, Germany for three years. He attended the Officer Advance Course before assuming a staff position at USAISESA, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. After completing his 18-month stint as commander of the 69th Signal Company he resigned his commission to pursue a career as a freelance artist. He recently accepted the position of Art Director for the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin and continues to do commercial art and illustration on the side.



TACTICAL QUESTIONING PROGRAM: Using Your Bilingual Soldiers to Gather Human Intelligence

by Second Lieutenant Jeffrey F. Pittman

How can we gather human intelligence (HUMINT) information if our linguists do not speak the target language? The 10th Mountain Division developed a Tactical Questioning Program (TQP) to attack this problem.

Once the division G2 identifies soldiers who are proficient in a specific language, the 110th MI Battalion's interrogation platoon conducts a class to improve their sensitivity to questioning techniques and information needs. The TQP represents a unique approach to using an asset that is common to most units: the bilingual soldier. In a non-combat situation, the trained soldier will bridge the communication gap for his commander. In a combat situation he will expedite the collection and dissemination of information of immediate tactical value (ITV). If trained and managed correctly, the bilingual soldier can play a significant role in the future success of his unit.

Every unit in a division has an implied mission to report information about the enemy, weather and terrain. Division units are assigned collection missions based on their primary missions, capabilities and locations. Non-MI units provide a great deal of real-time targeting data and combat information which is of great importance to the production of intelligence. For example, infantry maneuver units close with and destroy the enemy and, through direct contact, collect significant quantities of timely information of tactical value for themselves and higher echelons. In a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment, especially during the early phases, the enemy blends in with the population, making detection by other than HUMINT collection means almost impossible.

The 10th's dedicated HUMINT collection assets come from the MI Battalion's interrogation and counterintelligence (CI) platoons. Divisional interrogation teams may be employed at all levels—battalion, brigade and division. Their primary mission is to interrogate and screen. They can also provide limited translator and interpreter support. However, an interrogation team cannot provide both types of support simultaneously.

The interrogator's worst foe is time. Because of the lack of mobility within a light infantry division, it could take up to 24 hours to transport enemy prisoners of war (EPW) to a collection point for interrogation. Prisoners may have information that could become useless during this wait.

Time becomes even more critical on the battlefield. ITV is extremely perishable, requiring fast action by collection assets so that maneuver elements can react. The goal is to help expedite the collection and dissemination of pertinent information. While questioning is generally an interrogator's job, many times interrogation personnel may not be available. The job can still be accomplished by "tactical questioners" whose language capability is near native. The trained "tactical questioner" can expedite the collection process of ITV by extracting and reporting immediately. The interrogator is trained to use different approaches and techniques to obtain information. The "tactical questioner" is taught only one, "the direct approach" which is really quite simple and effective.

When an interrogator doesn't speak the language of the country where he is to conduct operations, then he must use an interpreter. The use of an interpreter can create unnecessary confusion and difficulty, and the availability of foreign nationals to perform this role is limited. Therefore, in the 10th, bilingual soldiers are selected to perform the duties of interpreter.

Using this organic asset within the division reduces the security problems that arise when using foreign nationals. Also, using the bilingual soldier's military experience provides a base of technical and military terminology that indige-

nous civilian personnel would be lacking.

The soldier is the only other HUMINT collection asset organic to the 10th. It goes without saying that the soldier is one of the division's best collectors. Combined with the technical expertise of the collection assets within the 110th MI Battalion, the bilingual soldier helps maximize the 10th Mountain Division's effectiveness in any combat environment.

Non-combat Situation

A soldier who speaks an additional language plays an important role in a non-combat situation. He may come into contact with the local population, government officials and military of the host nation. In this situation he is taught to support his unit's mission by: (1) acting as an ambassador for his unit, (2) interpreting and translating for his commander, (3) teaching classes to foreign nationals, and (4) listening, observing and reporting information of military value.

When training in a foreign country, troops are often attached to sister units of the host-nation military. Occasionally, the soldier is assigned to be a representative for his unit while conducting operations near populated areas. In this capacity the soldier is an ambassador. What he does and says has a major impact on the people with whom he comes into contact and directly reflects on the U.S. Army. It makes good sense to educate the bilingual soldier on the do's and don'ts of the host nation. In a LIC environment public relations become even more important. We need the popular support of the local people to eliminate the insurgents' base of support.

More often than not, leaders who do not speak the host-nation's language discover that it is almost impossible to communicate. They often find themselves in situations that require an interpreter. The bilingual soldier is more likely to act as an interpreter than in any other role; he is his leader's means of communication. The act of interpreting is more complicated than just speaking a foreign language. This is why the TQP provides the soldier with a military dictionary and teaches the basic techniques of good interpreting. With realistic scenarios developed into practical exercises, the TQP tests the abilities of the soldiers and gives them a feel for the degree of difficulty.

Units conducting training within a foreign country are sometimes tasked to train host-nation civilians and military personnel. Combat units, for example, train host-nation soldiers on new weapons systems while soldiers from a medical unit train grade school classes in personal hygiene. Teaching a class in English is difficult enough if you're not prepared; teaching in another language is even harder. Being familiar with technical and military terminology not only saves time but prevents embarrassment because there is less explaining and describing to do. During the TQP training, two soldiers teach a common task: one is put on the spot while the other is given minimum time to prepare.

By listening and observing, a bilingual soldier can obtain and report information of military value. This could be as insignificant as an engineer soldier overhearing a native say, "Don't those soldiers know that when the river rises, the bridge they're building will wash away?" or as significant as a soldier overhearing university students plotting against his unit. During the non-combat portion of the TQP, each student receives a list of LIC early warning indicators.

Combat Situation

In a combat situation the soldier who speaks another language becomes even more valuable. During a conflict, the soldier may come in contact with civilian detainees, suspected guerrillas, EPW or captured enemy documents (CED). In this situation he is taught to support his unit's

mission by gathering and reporting information of immediate tactical value by: (1) quickly selecting personnel for immediate questioning, (2) preparing for questioning, (3) performing combat questioning, (4) taking notes on information gathered, (5) properly handling CED, and (6) reporting information through the proper command channels.

Let's use the following hypothetical situation as an example: After chatting with the village priest one evening, Corporal Trilingual (from an engineer unit) submits through his chain of command information about an abandoned mine that is not indicated on the map. Early next morning, Sergeant Bilingual receives an order to take his squad and recon the abandoned mine located at VD 45313659. A helicopter drops his squad off near the mine. During movement toward the objective, the squad encounters enemy fire. No one is hurt. The enemy tries to break contact, but not soon enough. As the troops exchange fire, Bilingual sees three enemy fall to the ground.

As the squad approaches the three wounded enemy soldiers, one of them shoots and kills a member of the squad. Returning fire, Bilingual kills the hostile enemy and takes the other two as prisoners.

Disarming the first enemy soldier, Bilingual orders his team leaders to set up a 360 degree perimeter. He calls in his status report, only to find out that he is to stand fast for 45 minutes before the helcopter can pick up his unit. Remembering his TQP training, Bilingual quickly prepares the three things necessary for questioning—the prisoner, himself and the scene. He separates the two prisoners while the medics patchup their wounds. Finding a spot with cover and concealment on the downhill slope, Bilingual positions his prisoner away from his companion.

Making a few scribbled notes on a piece of paper, he draws a hasty format for questioning using the 5 Ws (who, what, when, where and why) to gather the elements of a SALUTE report.

Bilingual, now finished with his questions, double checks his notes to see if he left anything out. He reviews the documents he found on one of the prisoners and finds a map with what looks like the route from the mine shaft to the enemy's base camp.

Bilingual is now prepared to report the ITV in SALUTE format to his platoon leader. Once he is finished he looks at his watch and discovers that the whole questioning process took only 20 minutes to complete.

Meanwhile, Captain Commander hears Bilingual's report and realizes that he has a platoon patrolling near the enemy escape route. He knows that once a position is compromised, the insurgent force moves to establish another temporary base camp. Commander quickly orders one of his platoons to set up an ambush.

Later that day, Lieutenant Platoon Leader informs Bilingual that he did an excellent job and that the ambush was successful. Not only was the ITV reported rapidly and correctly, but the hard copy of the SALUTE report and the map that he sent with the prisoner will assist the interrogators in a later, more extensive interrogation.

A Great Tool

There is no intention of making these soldiers interrogators or CI agents. Soldiers are instructed that this type of questioning is in itself **preparation for later, detailed interrogation**.

Before a recent deployment to Honduras for training, the S2 of the 2/22 Infantry Battalion coordinated with the 110th to present its initial TQP to 23 Spanish bilinguals. During the debriefing at the end of the training exercise, it became quite evident that the TQP is a great tool for the soldier and his unit. The S2 now provides subordinate units with "priority questions" based on the commander's priority intelligence requirements/information requirements. After the units returned from training, many of these generic questions were incorporated in 2/22's tactical SOP.

Conclusion

When the 10th Mountain Division participates in deployments around the globe, it only follows that our soldiers (bilingual) will be exposed to, and have contact with, the local population—friendly or not. Combined with the MI battalion's collection assets, bilingual soldiers will help us maximize our effectiveness.

Second Lieutenant Jeffrey F. Pittman was commissioned in Military Intelligence in 1986 from Weber State College in Utah. In Germany, he served in both the 4th and 8th Infantry Divisions as an infantry mortarman. Pittman served with the 142d MI Linguist Battalion as the German CI Assistant Platoon Leader. He is presently assigned as IPW Platoon Leader in the 110th MI Battalion, 10th Mountain Division (LI). He is a Spanish and German linguist.

IPW Quiz

by Chief Warrant Officer Four Lowell T. Crace

The following quiz is not for interrogators to play trivia but for the commanders of interrogation personnel. The questions are taken from actual situations and events. Do not try to read something devious into the questions. Take them for face value.

1. Who is ultimately responsible for the successful accomplishment of interrogation elements?

A. Interrogation team sergeant
B. Interrogation team leader
C. Commander
D. G2

2. Which officer is trained to interrogate prisoners of war?

A. 35D
B. 35E
C. 351B
D. 351E

3. What other primary functions do interrogators perform in addition to interrogation?

A. Interpreter/translator
B. S1-4, staff functions
C. Commander's driver
D. Clerical duties

4. Who determines in which order sources will be interrogated?

A. Commander
B. S2
C. Interrogation platoon leader
D. Senior interrogator

5. Which action is accomplished by anyone with an interpreter?

A. An interrogation
B. A conversation
C. A debriefing
D. An interview

6. Which of the following provides the most usable and reliable information?

A. Select uses of force, as in movies, TV etc.
B. Threats and insults deemed appropriate for the situation
C. Those techniques ordered or condoned by the supervisor
D. Psychological techniques and principles in FM 34-52

7. How are interrogators configured for deployment from a higher (division) to lower echelons?

A. Task organized (one or more) to meet the need
B. Always in teams of five (WO, E-6, E-5, 2xE-4)
C. In support of counterintelligence personnel
D. Held at division to wait for sources

8. Which intelligence asset has a unique capability best trained to provide information on enemy intentions, capabilities and combat effectiveness?

A. Signals intelligence
B. Imagery intelligence
C. Human intelligence
D. Timely intelligence

9. Who determines the status of a detainee?

A. Interrogator, following established criteria for environment
B. S2/G2, following the commanders guidance
C. Interrogator, by guidance of the military police
D. Interrogation platoon leader, following guidance of the commander

10. How are interrogation reports distributed?

A. Military police/guard escort, next higher interrogation element, S2/G2
B. S2, MI support company; MI battalion S2, division G2
C. Military police, brigade TCAE, division TCAE, division ASP/MMD
D. S2, supported brigade, copy of report with EPW escort

11. Who should be given priority for interrogation?

A. Officers, regardless of rank
B. Sources, willing to talk
C. Wounded, because they will be quickly evacuated
D. Senior NCOs followed by other soldiers, then civilians

12. Which portion(s) of a Tactical Interrogation Report (TIR) is completed in a NATO environment?

A. Part I
B. Part I and all paragraphs of Part II
C. Part I and only those paragraphs of Part II which satisfy the commander's IRs
D. Only those paragraphs of Part I and Part II satisfying the commander's IRs

13. Which of the following has priority for exploitation?

A. An operator's manual on a new crew-served antitank weapon
B. Prisoners, detainees and other sources
C. Documents (notebooks, maps, letters)
D. A new individual weapon

14. Who is responsible for handling and evacuation of prisoners?

A. MPs
B. S5
C. S2
D. S1

15. Which of the following is the interrogator?

A. A person with a qualified interpreter
B. A person who speaks the target language
C. A person with the target language who is serving as the S2/G2
D. A person trained in interrogation (with or without the target language)

16. When should language maintenance be conducted?

A. Whenever and integrated into training exercises
B. Only during off duty (strictly a personal responsibility)
C. During specified exercises only where language is available
D. Intensely for two weeks once or twice a year at a language school

17. During which period(s) are interrogators employed?

A. During wartime
B. During peacetime
C. During war and peacetime
D. During mid-and high-intensity conflicts only

18. Which of the following statements is true?

A. A dead drop can be found using Radio Direction Finding or DFing
B. Interrogators understand the enemy
C. A courier can be determined by imagery
D. Voice intercept operators make excellent interpreters

19. Which of the following statements is true?

A. There is clear and concise doctrine for joint service interrogation operations
B. All interrogators in INSCOM units are gainfully employed in their MOS
C. All interrogators in FORSCOM units are gainfully employed in their MOS
D. Reenlistment rates for first-term interrogators is low.

20. Hague Convention Number IV of 1907 and Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War applies to:

A. Everyone
B. Interrogators
C Combat arms personnel
D. Military police and escort/guard personnel

21. Who is responsible for guarding prisoners in the absence of military police at division?

A. Division band
B. Detailed combat arms soldiers
C. Host-nation military police or equilavent
D. Interrogators assisted by other DISCOM personnel

22. What is the minimum language proficiency level required for interrogators?

A. Listening 1/Reading 1
B. Listening 1+/Reading 1+
C. Listening 2/Reading 2
D. Listening 3/Reading 3

23. Where are interrogation assets located within the brigade area of operations?

A. DISCO
B. DISCOM
C. Vicinity of brigade headquarters
D. Brigade trains

24. What is the lowest echelon to which interrogators may be deployed?

A. Division only
B. Brigade only
C. Battalion only
D. Where needed

(Answers on page 38)

Crypto Corner

by Chief Warrant Officer Two Leroy Engle

The first step in solving any cryptogram is to perform a frequency distribution analysis. This simply means counting the number of times each letter occurs.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
5 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 3 1 7 4 1 0 6

S T U V W X Y Z
6 1 3 1 1 0 2 2 0

Then list the eight most frequently occurring letters in order:

T E I N R S A O

It just so happens that the eight most frequently occurring letters in the English language (as you've learned from watching "Wheel of Fortune") are **E T N O R I A S**

Since all the letters, although in a little different order, appear to be there, we immediately believe that in this system the letters have retained their original identity. Now, we count the number of letters in the cryptogram. 16 x 5 = 80. What matrices could be used to make 80? Our first thought is 8 x 10 = 80. We look at the fact that there are 2 Xs, theoretically seldom used letters. Count backwards from the last X, and we find that the other X is 10 spaces back. Aha! It fits one of our dimensions. We draw a rectangle ten squares across and eight squares down. Now, we simply begin filling in the boxes from left to right, top to bottom. The message now looks like:

I	O	Y	T	A	I	B	E	L	C
N	S	S	T	I	D	U	T	A	A
T	I	T	E	N	E	T	H	T	T
R	T	E	R	T	N	C	E	I	I
A	I	M	S	H	T	H	I	V	O
N	O	S	R	E	I	A	R	E	N
S	N	L	E	I	T	N	R	L	X
P	S	E	T	R	Y	G	E	O	X

Notice that the two Xs now appear together at the bottom right of the cryptogram. Another hint can now be gained, since we believe that they are fillers and would be read one after the other. The message is read from top to bottom, left to right, ending in the bottom right corner. Therefore, we start in the upper left hand corner and read down. **IN TRANSPOSITION SYSTEMS, LETTERS RETAIN THEIR IDENTITY, BUT CHANGE THEIR RELATIVE LOCATION XX.**

This month, we will do something that is a little bit more familiar to most people. Each letter will change its identity, but not its location. Look for common occurring digraphs such as qu, st, th, on, etc. (However, they won't appear that way to you). Also look for double consonants and vowels or definite word patterns. The length of the words in this cryptogram have not been hidden in order for you to get the hang of it. In the next issue they will be hidden in groups.

TZKQ PXS LBS JSPGSXQBUV PL LBS

ZOLLUTM SGMS KD LBS PXHW. LBSW

LXPUT COTUKX KDDUZSXQ PTG MXKA

QKJGUSXQ UTLK TZKQ. ZKHHPTC

QSXMSPTL HPCKX GPRUG B. NJSUT

Hint: There are three occurrences of the trigraph LBS and one with LBSW. Try *the, then, them, they.*

Answers to IPW QUIZ:

ANSWERS: 1. C, 2. D, 3. A, 4. D, 5. B, 6. D, 7. A, 8. C, 9. A, 10. D, 11. B, 12. C, 13. B, 14. D, 15. D, 16. A, 17. C, 18. B, 19. D, 20. A, 21. A, 22. C, 23. D, 24. D

ETCETERA

This section is something new for our professional bulletin. In this section I will try to present something a little different in each issue. Professional development can take many different forms. I will use this section to explore some of them.

In this issue, Second Lieutenant Ruth Pennington has written a semi-fictional account of life as seen through the eyes of a Soviet worker. Read it. I hope it will stimulate some thought.

The Editor

SOME ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS

Today provided little respite; after leaving work I waited in line for two hours to buy one pound of Polish sausage. I came home, cooked supper, then made lunch for tomorrow. Afterward, I washed the supper dishes, washed our clothes and dusted the state-provided furniture in our state-built, two-bedroom apartment. I waited for Misha, my eight-year-old son, to come home. I lost him to the street gangs after Babushka died. My husband's foolish attempt at creating a future little Pioneer failed miserably; he was too drunk to even be ashamed of his failure. Finally, I escaped into a dreamless sleep.

Morning arrived too quickly. With the rising sun arose another wretched, exhausting daily ordeal. My fellow workers from the Moscow Textile Factory met me at the Metro stop on Leninskii Prospect. We usually talked about the miserable and boring lives we lead. However, this morning our conversation turned out to be quite unusual.

One of our group had gotten her hands on the political report delivered by Mikhail Sergeovich to the 27th Congress. Her brother worked in one of the many ministries and had left his copy at her apartment. Of course, I cannot tell you her name lest

she be arrested. She had read the report like any good Marxist-Leninist would. Then, as was the rule when it came to good, or even bad, literature (as long as it was distracting), she demanded that we all read it. Today would be a short bus ride, for there was a lot to be discussed, a lot to be said.

Aksyinka loves Mikhail Sergeovich. She thinks he is Lenin reborn. I think she is crazy. Anyway, she believes he will do, if he has not already done it all, everything he said in that report about shortening a woman's workday, granting 18 months of paid maternity leave, letting mothers work at home, granting child allowances, and allowing paid days off to care for sick children. But poor Aksyinka is only a naive young woman, just recently graduated from the university and married at 24. She and her husband live in a three-bedroom apartment with her mother, grandparents and two brothers. Her all-too-recent wedded bliss blinds her to the press of humanity within her own home.

Thus, when she speaks of her belief in Mikhail Sergeovich and a brighter future, we gently rebuke her, "How ridiculous!" We all ask, "If we work less and get more time off for birthing more Marxist-Leninists, how will we be able to provide even more clothing and shoes and food for the larger family? Our husbands drink away their wages, and we will get paid, but we will work harder at home than we do already." She does not understand our cynicism, our lack of faith and our weariness of life.

Upon graduating from university and officially joining the Party after six years in the Komsomol, I, too, had looked upon my socialist world as the finest on earth. I had been the youngest woman to win a seat in the local soviet at the age of 22. I helped research many social projects and planned many public works. I felt all that I did was advancing my socialist world that much closer to utopia. I did not know that no one read my findings, and my good projects were developed with someone else's name on them.

After marrying Gregorii Illyanovich, I resigned from my position on the soviet and began the search for work for the advancement of the state. I found my opportunity to contribute to socialist progress at the Moscow Textile Factory. I could tell that the Soviet Union grew more powerful every time I surpassed my quota.

Yet, soon I longed to be in the soviets; I longed to make hard political and ideological decisions. I longed to make a difference just like Vera Zasulich, my heroine, who had fought along with the men in the Revolution. After the Bolsheviks' victory, another woman, Alexandra Kollantai, fought even harder to raise the influence and power of all women in the Bolshevik party and in the Soviet Union.

Lenin, to whom realization of a woman's capabilities came not only through Marx, but through the extraordinary efforts and example of his wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, pushed for women's liberation and equality. However, when Stalin came to power, his conservatism cut off the drive for women's liberation and equality. As a Soviet mother later said, "They emancipated us, but forgot to tell the men."

Three years after the 27th Congress had received his progress report, listing all that had to be realized in order to further improve our socialist world, Mikhail Sergeovich has temporarily succeeded in curtailing the efforts of his opposition. But he has failed to produce many tangible goods for the patient, deserving socialist people. As yet, I am still waiting on the promised consumer goods, the shorter hours, the children's allowances. I wait for the lines to get shorter, for my wages to get higher, and my promotions to come faster.

It has been said, "A hen is not a bird, and a woman is not a person." I know from experience, now that the rose-colored glasses of youth no longer hinder my vision, that in order to make as much as my husband, an electrician, I must work two shifts at the factory. Moreover, I must wait ten years before I am promoted to chief clothes inspector. A young man who started work at the Textile Factory two years ago is now the shift foreman. My friend, Vera Alexandrovich, who has been there 12 years, spent the last five as floor supervisor. She would have been the best choice as shift foreman; however, her immediate supervisor, a man, would not have trusted her competence or listened seriously to any of her suggestions or complaints.

My husband works very hard; he drinks even harder. I work over 15 hours a day; he works eight (if he is sober). He comes home three hours before I do. The minute I walk in the door, he screams for his dinner. If I do not move fast enough or if one of

the neighbors occupies the one stove shared between us too long, I receive a slap across my face or feel the sting of a belt across my back. I am a woman and his wife; that is all that is necessary in order to deserve a beating.

Mikhail Sergeovich, in his progress report, made the following claim:

> *Socialism has emancipated women from economic and social oppression, securing for them the opportunity to work, obtain an education and participate in public life on an equal footing with men. The socialist family is based on the full equality of men and women and their equal responsibility for the family.*

As my friends and I view our socialist world, we see no clear evidence of this equality. Our husbands do not wait in long lines to shop for the day's groceries, nor do they sweep and mop the floors. Our husbands do not give the children a bath or tell them bedtime stories. Our husbands do not encourage us to seek a better paying job than they in order to improve our living conditions. Our husbands are the men who did not hear about what Mikhail Sergeovich spoke.

I remember the dreams I had as a Young Pioneer. I was the General Secretary and conqueror of the whole world. I ruled with the pure fire and just benevolence of Lenin. I loved all the people as a mother would love all her children, even though they were not born of the same father. I destroyed the cruel capitalists, and I decorated those men and women dedicated to Communism. I was truly loved by all and exalted.

Once I began to live as a new socialist woman, my night visions were no longer all light and happiness. I was, instead, a babushka, lined and worn. I stood in brilliant sun but cast no shadow. All around me stormed a sea of dust, a sky of tortured flames. The winds screamed, yet no breeze lifted my skirts. In the distance a dot appeared, growing larger as the distance dissolved. I felt no fear as the missile pierced me, for my soul had already surrendered to those dreams of my youth. In my death I denied the socialist society any knowledge of my inadequacy, my disappointment and even my pain in life.



Second Lieutenant Ruth Pennington is a 1989 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. She is currently a student in the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course.

LESSONS LEARNED

Apache Campaign Staff Ride

by Dr. Bruce D. Saunders

Although the feared Apache chief Geronimo surrendered to Brigadier General Nelson Miles at Skeleton Canyon in southeastern Arizona over 100 years ago, there is still a great interest in the series of battles known collectively as the Apache Campaigns, 1883-1886. Intelligence professionals can derive a number of significant lessons from these campaigns. Careful study of the tactics and strategies of a very small, highly mobile, self-sustaining and lightly armed Apache force provides a number of lessons to reinforce many accepted operational techniques. The Apache campaigns furnish valuable insights into the effects of terrain on mobility, the importance of an adequate logistics system, and the constant need for communications in a remote and isolated region.

When the Apache warriors under Geronimo and other leaders prepared to engage a modern (by 19th century standards) force that had repeating rifles, cannons, telegraphic communications and superiority in terms of manpower and logistics, few gave the Apache a chance. Yet the Apache defeated Spanish, Mexican and American military forces for over a hundred years while exploiting the land for food and shelter.

American soldiers in the late 19th century faced many of the problems that an MI analyst faces today: how to gather information about an ethnic minority with a vastly different set of values, a very different socioeconomic system, and a nomadic nature who had determined that they would continue to resist subjugation.

The entire Apache Campaign, when studied in depth, provides soldiers with a better understanding of the very difficult problems associated with what is now termed low intensity conflict (LIC). The parallels between the Army/Apache battles in the late 19th century and the present situations in areas of the Philippines, several regions in Central America, and Afghanistan are especially illuminating. As one strategist once wrote, "there are no new lessons of warfare, only old lessons that we have forgotten to relearn."

In an attempt to capture the lessons from the Apache Wars, and in a parallel effort to bring the complexities of LIC to the attention of USAICS

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students, work is underway to develop an Apache Campaign staff ride. The staff ride as an instructional method also dates from the late 19th century when students at the Army General School at Fort Leavenworth studied lessons learned from Civil War battles. Then they travelled to the actual battlefield to gain a detailed understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures that were used.

During the inter-war period (1920-1940) the staff ride virtually disappeared as an instructional method because of urbanization and a shortage of funds. But in the past 10 years, the staff ride has regained popularity within the Army in the United States, Europe, Korea and even North Africa.

More recently, TRADOC Regulation 350-13 directed that all students in the Officer Advanced Courses participate in a staff ride. At the Intelligence Center and School, lacking a large local battlefield, we decided to use the Battle of Gettysburg as a modified staff ride exercise, although students do not journey to the actual site. Using a terrain board, the **Official Records,** and Shaara's excellent book, **The Killer Angels**, all OAC and OBC students have participated in a classroom version of a staff ride. While this exercise has provided students with the staff ride methodology and a detailed understanding of a large Civil War battle, it has not offered them the opportunity to walk the terrain, appreciate the logistical problems or the difficulties of gathering and analyzing intelligence. The Apache Campaign staff ride will remedy many of these shortcomings.

Designed as the only LIC staff ride in TRADOC, it will provide students an opportunity to gain a greater understanding of campaign planning, the difficulties of finding and fixing an elusive enemy, the problems of international borders, and the crucial importance of IPB to any military operation. Other important aspects will center on command relationships, the importance of translators/interpreters, and the problems of logistics while operating in a remote and isolated area miles away from secure supply points. With the implementation of the new LIC staff ride for all MIOAC students in the fall of 1989, USAICS will continue in the forefront of all TRADOC schools and continue its tradition of remaining **ALWAYS OUT FRONT**.

Dr. Bruce D. Saunders is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School Command Historian.

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3. What makes this book different than others with similar subjects?

4. Follow the writer's guide, located on page 26 of this issue.

That's all there is to it.

John Vance
Editor

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The Illustrated Face of Battle by John Keegan, New York: Viking Press, 1989, 294 pages, $29.95.

I most heartily recommend that this book be read carefully by all military and political leaders.

As fewer and fewer people with battlefield experience are still around, books such as this become more and more valuable. Keegan's original purpose for writing the book in 1976 was to provide a more realistic study of the human part of battle. The original version was quite successful, and this new edition adds to the effectiveness of the first one by illustrating many of the situations described in the book. Illustrations vary from photographs to drawings by artists who actually participated in the battles described. The text, illustrations, printing and binding combine to make this an exceptional volume.

Keegan's premise is that most military history is written from the strategic point of view. The soldiers who fought have little place in such history. Keegan, an instructor at the British Military Academy at Sandhurst (the British equivalent to West Point), wrote this book in an attempt to convey to his students more than the planning and maneuvering of battle. He wants his students to be face-to-face with battle, to be on the battlefield spiritually and intellectually.

The book is organized in an unusual manner. Keegan selects three battles to portray. The first is the battle of Agincourt in 1415, the second is Waterloo, 400 years later, and the third is the Somme Offensive of 1916. Keegan first describes the strategic situation leading to each battle. Then he briefly describes the battle itself. Finally, departing from traditional military history, he changes scale from the battle as a whole to the viewpoint of an individual soldier.

From a soldier's perspective, Keegan first describes the different types of combat. Archers versus infantry and cavalry, cavalry versus infantry, and infantry versus infantry are the three subcategories of combat for the battle of Agincourt. For each subcategory, Keegan describes uniforms, weapons and tactics to enable the reader to imagine what it would be like to be a soldier on that particular battlefield. The effect provides new insights to someone who is accustomed to the usual historical treatment of the material.

Keegan then addresses treatment of the wounded and the types of wounds received. He next presents the problems of leadership and motivation. Why did these soldiers fight

and how did their leaders react to their unique problems? The differences between the leadership problems and troop motivation for the three battles is amazing. These differences emphasize the fact that good leaders reflect their societies and training and must know their troops.

The final chapter discusses the future of battle. Keegan discusses the vastly extended battlefields of World War II and the rapidity and uncertainty of Vietnam. Modern battle puts unimaginable strains on the soldiers involved because battles are inescapable. World War II battlefields were so huge that a soldier could not effectively run away. The mass destruction of World War II and even Vietnam made battle so impersonal and techno-mechanical that soldiers felt insignificant. Killing became mechanical.

Keegan's conclusion is hopeful. He determines that people who study battle and who have experienced its horrors are determined to prevent further battles. The human mind and spirit cannot comprehend or adjust to the awfulness of future battles. Consequently, Keegan expresses the hope that battles as they have been fought for centuries are over. There will be no more major land wars fought with massive quantities of infantry and tanks.

Although Keegan's theory about a major war may be correct, history in recent years has proven that battles, at least to a limited extent, will continue. Low- and mid-intensity conflicts have been simmering almost constantly in recent years. No major war has broken out, though, and ideally, none will. A significant contributor to the prevention of future large scale wars will be books like this one that can be studied by leaders who have become so far removed from battles that they cannot imagine the physical, mental and spiritual anguish that large scale warfare brings.

Captain Robert D. McMichael
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.



Hamburger Hill: May 11 - 20, 1969 by Samuel Ziffiri, Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988, $18.95.

Hamburger Hill is a straight combat account of action, based heavily on interviews with the participants. The book is valuable because the infantry and combined arms weapons systems used on Hamburger Hill are virtually identical to those the 101st would use today in combat.

One of the main difficulties the U. S. Army faced in Vietnam was bringing the enemy to battle. However, in the Spring of 1969, the 101st Airborne Division ran into well dug-in North Vietnamese Army units on a hill that came to be known as Hamburger Hill.

The main drawback to the book is that it never explains the intelligence failure that led to the battle. Why were the NVA dug in on Hamburger Hill, and why did they stay and fight? These were unknowns at the time, and they remain so.

Captain David K. Taggart
Fort Benning, Ga.

The Communist Party in Power: A Profile of Party Politics in Czechoslovakia by Karel Kaplan, (edited and translated by Fred Eidlin) Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987.

The chief weakness of this book is that the information it contains, with a few exceptions, refers to the period prior to 1968. There is no indication of whether or not the party has changed since 1968, or any insight into possible changes in the last three years that may have occurred at Soviet insistence. However, for the time period it covers, Kaplan does a creditable job. Anyone interested in the history of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, from the general reader to the specialist, will find the book interesting and useful.

Kaplan served for 18 years as an official at all levels in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. Part of this time was spent as a historian with access to the party archives. During

this time he microfilmed thousands of documents and later smuggled them out of the country. Drawing on his experiences and these documents, Kaplan's book examines how the Czechoslovakian Communist Party is organized and how it ruled from 1948 to 1968

The text is well written and interesting. The degree of detail presented in examining the role and authority of local party chiefs and how party meetings were conducted (in particular the weekly meetings of the CC Presidium) often makes for tedious reading. However, details are necessary to reveal the complexities of the inner workings of the system.

Fred Eidlin, the editor, points out two questionable assumptions made by the author. First, without any comparative analysis, Kaplan assumes that the power system in Czechoslovakia is similar to that in every other communist state. Second, he feels that the system is almost impossible to change and is not susceptable to decay. I agree with the editor that Kaplan is overly pessimistic and underestimates the possibility for change. The events of 1968 showed that change could occur and be stopped.

Mark Kramar
Tallahassee, Fla.

Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II by Louis E. Keefer, Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 1988

Louis Keefer, author of **Scholars in Foxholes**, does a valuable service in covering this piece of World War II history. Many of the attitudes and reactions of young Americans to military service have changed little since World War II. This makes this book particularly relevant to anyone who has training responsibilities at Fort Huachuca, Fort Devens or the Presidio.

The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) provided technical training on college campuses during World War II. Entrance requirements were high for the ASTP—the GT score required was as high or higher than for Officer Candidate School.

The War Department had mixed aims as to what to do with the program. There were conflicting claims about the type and amount of technical training that was necessary. The issue was politicized as well—ASTP kept many college classrooms open during the war.

Eventually, the manpower crunch of 1944 resolved the issue. OCS quotas had already been filled, and the "ASTPers" found themselves assigned as general replacements, regardless of their specialized training. Many ended up in the combat arms, where the need for replacements was greatest.

Captain David K. Taggart
Fort Benning, Ga.

War and Peace in Central America: Reality and Illusion by Frank McNeil, New York: Schribner's Sons, 1988, 310 pages, $19.95.

It's unfortunate. **War and Peace in Central America** has many good ideas but the author has buried them in a book filled with emotional rhetoric and historical and personal sidenotes that break up the flow of the text. You have to wade through the rhetoric to uncover the point and sift through the emotion to find the facts.

The book reads more like a newspaper editorial than a serious study of the problems with U.S. policy in Central America. Not that that's bad; editorials are fine if they take up a few newspaper columns, but they get old if you pay $19.95 and have to struggle through a rambling monologue where you're often asking yourself, "Where's he going with this?"

It's obvious McNeil is unhappy and you feel that his judgment may be clouded. He is a former U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica who admits he had a serious professional and personal disagreement with Elliott Abrams, the ex-Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. But, despite the book's title, McNeil leaves you with the impression that one of the reasons he wrote his book is to defend himself and justify his actions, which included resigning from a successful career with the State Department. In fact, the book's appendices include his letter of resignation, then-Secretary of State George Shultz's reply, and a brief note to Abrams.

The other problem with the book is simply one of organization. McNeil often uses historical and personal anecdotes to prove his point, but in many cases he does it in such a way that you lose track of where he is going. In the midst of a comment on current events, McNeil

jolts you into the past without a decent transition. Sometimes his personal anecdotes appear to be designed to impress you with who he knows and what he did, rather than with supporting his central ideas.

In short, the book lacks focus. And that's a shame. McNeil has some good, although not new, ideas that deserve consideration. He definitely takes the middle road in Central American politics, and there's plenty that would anger both the extreme left and right.

Just some of the ideas McNeil brings up in examining Central America are:

* The region's history of *caudillos* transcends today's politics.

* The center path is difficult with ideologues of the left and right to criticize you.

* Intervention is a matter of perspective. (He quotes a Central American politician who said, "When the United States does something in this hemisphere I don't like, it's intervention. When the United States does something I like, it's inter-American cooperation.")

* Central American countries continue to intervene in each others' affairs at least as often as the United States.

* Central America has plenty of its own problems without blowing the East-West conflict out of proportion.

Despite the book's good ideas, its problems outweigh its value, and like other contemporary history books it is already becoming dated. If you must read it, check it out at the library, or wait until it is on sale at a bookstore.

Captain Raymond W. Levesque
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Behind a Curtain of Silence—Japanese in Soviet Custody, 1945-1956 by William F. Nimmo, New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, 149 pages.

William Nimmo has written an interesting and well organized book. He lays out the issues and examines each in depth. The sources are the Supreme Command Allied Powers records, the Japanese government and private persons. Those interested in the Pacific War in this far-off and relatively unknown corner will find the book stimulating.

Nimmo spent time in Japan during the years of the occupation and became intrigued with the repatriation, or lack thereof, of the Japanese civilians and military caught in the onrush of the Soviet forces during the last days of World War II. The Soviet Union, after revoking its nonaggression pact with Japan, attacked Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. They quickly overran these territories and began the imprisonment of the settlers, residents and military. That detainment is the focus of Nimmo's study. He examines what happened to these people and the discrepancies of numbers—those present in 1945 and those repatriated later, much later.

The deaths in Soviet POW camps were staggering, and Nimmo tells the survivors' stories well. Nimmo examines the reasons for the deaths and the mechanics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) camps. Prisoners were moved wherever Stalin's economics dictated—some as far away as European Russia. Soviet treatment of their own political prisoners wasn't any better than the treatment of their "guests." The often cited 20 million Russians killed in World War II may hide some of the "internal deaths" from MVD and national policies.

Nimmo writes about the shifting changes within the camps and the difficulties when command lost control to zealots. These "conversions" created a problem for the senior persons and once new leaders emerged then repatriation appeared closer.

Could some of these unaccounted-for thousands still be held incognito? Have they become part of the Soviet scene? In the confusion, did some suffer the same fate as the officer corps in Poland? The Soviets offer the argument that some slipped back to Japan like many of the key bacteriological personnel who experimented on Allied POWs. Some may have been killed by indigenous people. The fact remains that there are still 93,000 unaccounted for.

Peter C. Unsinger
San Jose State Univ., Calif.

Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East by Damian J. Fernandez, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988, 160 pages, $19.95.

Premier Fidel Castro has expanded his original notions of sponsoring liberationist guerrilla wars into a full spectrum of politico-military services. He leads a diplomatic and military array of overt and clandestine

forces aimed at creating a Marxist-Leninist world.

Damian J. Fernandez, political science professor at Colorado College, traces Castro's efforts to become a significant player in the world's hottest region, the Middle East. He studied in the archives of the Cuban Information System at the Univ. of Miami Graduate School of International Studies and in the Hispanic Division of the Library of Congress. The book is written primarily for Latin Americanists, and the Middle Eastern scholarly source materials appear mostly to be secondary.

The first chapter is a summary of Cuban foreign policy from 1960-1985. It is easily the best thing of its kind in print and should be incorporated into a book of readings on Cuba or on Soviet surrogates in the developing world.

Next comes a survey chapter on Cuban policies in the Middle East, as a region, followed by a chapter containing a country-by-country implementation of those policies. These two chapters form the centerpiece of the book. A special case study on Cuban-Libyan relations follows, and it contains some surprises. Where the casual observer might expect Muammar el-Qaddafi and Castro to find common ground as leading scourges of the industrial West, Qaddafi, while sharing Castro's anti-Zionist and anti-United States enthusiasm, finds Castro to be too faithful a Soviet ally .

The summary chapter develops some interesting conjectures on how and why Cuba is even a player in the Middle Eastern cauldron. After all, Cuba needs Middle Eastern petroleum but is financially bankrupt, totally beholden to Soviet largesse for significant purchases. The Middle East hardly lacks for glinty-eyed revolutionists who know the fine points of the AK-47 or the radio-detonated car bomb. Yet Castro has indeed multi-regionalized Middle Eastern turbulence with his presence, despite an overwhelming lack of assets and logical reasons.

Fernandez relies strongly on Foreign Broadcast Information Service bulletins for Cuban actions, where more credibility would be attained through analysis of what Middle Eastern leaders think of Cuba. Michael Stuehrenberg wrote recently in the liberal weekly ***Die Zeit*** of Hamburg that "Cuba is considered by many of the poorest nations to be an international superpower.... They view Castro not as Moscow's representative but as its successor." Fernandez does not go quite so far.

Pointing to the glittering opportunities which first attracted Castro to interpose his country in Middle Eastern affairs, Fernandez concludes that the region is tough for any outsider to manipulate, and that Castro still has to accept Soviet guidelines, even if he is not simply a stooge of the Kremlin.

Fernandez says that the Middle East might well be Castro's and revolutionary Cuba's last international frontier. However, the chart on page 56 shows an impressive array of regional penetration by a small country regime that U.S. patriots used to tell me, in 1960, could be "cleaned out by a squad of well-trained Marines with baseball bats."

Dr. Russell W. Ramsey
Maxwell AFB, Ala.

The Wilson Plot by David Leigh, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, 255 pages.

The Wilson Plot is a fascinating account of the underside of post-World War II intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic and the lengths to which people will go in finding scapegoats for their own professional mistakes.

Was Harold Wilson, the former Labor Party Prime Minister of England, a Soviet spy? That perplexing question is the gist of this highly interesting book by David Leigh, a British reporter. Leigh's book is the amazing story of the political struggle by the various British secret service agencies, MI5 and MI6 to discredit and drive Wilson from office. It is Leigh's view that the serious allegations against Wilson have no merit in fact. He believes that the only thing the prime minister did wrong was picking as his close, personal friends peo-

ple who, at certain times in their lives, were members or suspected members of the Communist Party.

The author traces Wilson's political career from his early days as head of the British Board of Trade to his rise as leader of the Labor Party. According to the English "spycatchers" (highly placed members of the British intelligence services), it was during Wilson's role as the head of the Board of Trade that he became a Soviet agent. At that time he made several trips to the Soviet Union as the British government was secretly selling jet engines to the Russians. It was during this period, two years after the end of World War II, that a political rift began to emerge between the Allies and the Soviet Union. The "spycatchers" insisted that if Wilson were a loyal British subject, why did he agree to sell these powerful engines to Britain's enemy?

The author describes the many friends with communist leanings who followed Wilson to Russia, his supposed sexual affairs with women on his staff and other personal improprieties. According to Leigh, the only thing that Harold Wilson could be accused of was guilt by association. He describes the various cabinet members who served under Wilson and who, by one chance or another, were falsely accused of supposed communist sympathies.

What were the reasons for Wilson's "perfidy"? He opposed the various modernization plans to strengthen British strategic nuclear missiles. He opposed Lyndon Johnson's policies in the Vietnam War. He deliberately pulled British forces out of South Asia. He allegedly kept a mistress (not true). All these charges were compiled under the name "Henry Worthington," in reality, Harold Wilson.

And who were the men who investigated these supposed communist leanings? They were the members of the very same intelligence services who were supposed to be answerable to the prime minister. The author puts much of the blame for the false rumors and gossip on the shoulders of Peter Wright, a senior member of MI5 and the author of the best-selling book on British espionage activities, **Spycatcher**. Also to blame are some of the top members of the British secret services, including Martin Furnival and Sir Maurice Oldfield, among others.

But the British spymasters weren't the only intelligence source out to get the prime minister. The author describes in detail the close working relationship between MI5 and James Angleton of the CIA. Angleton kept a massive file on Wilson's activities and shared his knowledge with his British counterparts.

One of the most interesting aspects of **The Wilson Plot** concerns the death of Hugh Gaitskell, Wilson's predecessor as head of the Labor Party. Gaitskell died suddenly and mysteriously in 1963. According to the author, "the spycatchers" suspected that the Russians assassinated Gaitskell in order to put their own man (Wilson) into 10 Downing Street.

The Wilson Plot is full of the most notorious names in post-World War II British intelligence failures: Blunt, Burgess, Philby, MacLean, etc. Leigh implies that MI5 pursued Wilson at such a fever pace in order to redeem their credibility among their intelligence colleagues.

Peter Kross
North Brunswick, N.J.

Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Hass, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987, 380 pages, $14.95.

This book is a valuable contribution on the subject of superpower arms control because of its thoughtful exposition of controversial issues. It will also serve as a useful reference work summarizing the background and process of the major arms control negotiations.

The purpose of this book is to assess what can be learned from four decades of arms control experience with the Soviet Union. Although the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a number of agreements in the 1960's and 1970's, there has been a growing belief in the United States that our step-by-step approach to arms control has not lived up to expectations. Some observers blame Soviet desire to seek military advantage and to lull the United States into a false sense of security. Others blame both sides for failing to curb the arms race. Still others argue that the problem stems less from arms control's meager accomplishments than from the unrealistically high expectations generated by the Nixon, Ford and Carter administra-

tions. This book attempts to derive lessons learned from the arms control process by studying what the expectations for a number of negotiations were and comparing them with the perceived results.

Superpower Arms Control is based largely on a research project, "Learning from Experience with Arms Control," conducted during 1985 and 1986 at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The project was sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The 12 contributors to this book were part of a working group that consisted of professors, research fellows, doctoral candidates and research assistants. Because this project was an effort of a rather tightly controlled group, it has much more unity of organization, methodology and style than is usually the case with an anthology.

The approach of the study is to examine the public record of arms control debates in the United States and to formulate general hypotheses about arms control and then examine their validity. Ten hypotheses became the backbone of the approach. Five focus on the prerequisites for and processes of arms control: bargaining from strength, genies in bottles (future weapons), unilateral restraint, linkage and effect on arms. The other five hypotheses deal with the effects of arms control: uncertainties, verification and compliance, lulling, political support and asymmetry. The book examines these hypotheses in the context of seven case studies: The Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Accidents Measures Agreement, SALT I, SALT II, the 1977-79 Negotiations on Antisatellite Weapons, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention. Four chapters analyze issues that arise in most of the cases: the lulling and stimulating effects of arms control, linkage, and verification and compliance.

The overall conclusions of the entire group effort can be summarized as follows: Considering the first hypothesis, they find that arms control agreements have been concluded only when neither side has had an appreciable advantage. In the hypothesis of future weapons, the researchers conclude that the examination of arms control history reveals that technological change is not an insurmountable obstacle to reaching meaningful limitations. But if either side prefers freedom of action regarding the weapons in question, "militarily significant constraints on any particular category of weapon eludes negotiations." As for the unilateral restraint hypothesis, the study finds little evidence to deal with the subject at all because neither side has abstained from significant military activity long enough to induce an observable and unambiguous response by the other side. The fourth hypothesis, linkage, does not lend itself to short summary as it is a question with too many variables. Consequently, the conclusions of this study raise more questions than they settle. In the fifth hypothesis, the effect on arms, the conclusion is much clearer. None of the arms control agreements studied seem to have had any impact on the existing forces structures. Nor have they, with the exception of the ABM Treaty, had much effect on modernization.

The second set of hypotheses, dealing with the effects on arms control, are equally instructive. Regarding what they called "uncertainties," the team observes that the arms control process and the agreements have helped reduce uncertainties in estimations and projections of each other's forces. As for verification and compliance, the authors note that this question has become a major source of political strain that could prove to be a barrier to future agreements. Regarding the lulling effect, the authors note that the concern in the United States that arms control agreements will lull the country into complacency is widely held and has had considerable influence. To summarize the complicated question of political support, the study notes that political support depends on many factors; congressional support has not depended on the degree of congressional involvement in the process; and "the public and the Allies have been positively disposed toward every negotiated agreement."

Finally, on the question of asymmetry (whether arms control has served Soviet interests more than those of the United States), the authors find little evidence to support the contention. Instead, they censure both doves and hawks for exaggerating the results of arms control when in fact its achievements have been very modest.

"If history reveals anything," the study concludes, "it is that arms control has proved neither as promising as some had hoped nor as dangerous as others had feared."

Joseph S. Gordon
National Defense Univ.

204th MI Wins Partnership Award

The following is a translation of an article published in the July 1989 issue of ***Heer*** *the publication of the German Army. We wish to thank Lieutenant Colonel Borke, German Army Liaison Officer, for calling it to our attention.*

For 21 years, American and German soldiers have been honored for their contributions to the "Project Partnership" program. As Partnership Officer for the 204th Military Intelligence Battalion, Captain Lou Ann Cunningham has forged a close friendship between her unit and the German Signal Battalion 220. When she first arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany, two and a half years ago, she knew almost nothing about Germany. In college in Nebraska, she had studied Spanish as a foreign language. Now, that has all changed. When she leaves the 204th next year, she will not only be missed by her American comrades, she will also be missed by the soldiers of the Signal Battalion 220.

Ranging from a joint soldiers' newspaper to a bi-national benefit concert in Donauwoerth, she and her counterpart in Signal Battalion 220 have coordinated about 60 joint happenings in the two battalions each year. The distance between the two units is only 45 kilometers and many of the young soldiers from both units participate in a wide variety of activities with their own age-groups during off-duty hours.

Cunningham has now been honored for her significant contributions to the "Joint Partnership" program. The Vice Chief of Staff of the German Army, paraphrasing Friedrich Schiller, said, "We can accomplish much, since we stand together." In his opinion, there is no degradation of the transatlantic friendship due to differences of opinion concerning short range nuclear delivery systems. "Whoever thinks thusly, is only judging the moment and that only based on outward appearances."

Speaking to the assembled soldiers who had come to honor all of the participants in the partnership program, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, said that, "These awards are being presented to you since you have combined the best qualities of a good soldier with those of a successful diplomat and an outstanding citizen."

550TH Military Intelligence Battalion

The 550th MI Battalion's crest and motto reflect the One-Army concept. The battalion is a Reserve Component unit—part of the 78th Division (Training) —and supports the 50th Armored Division, New Jersey National Guard. The 50th (Jersey Blues) and the 78th (Jersey Lightning) quite naturally contribute to the 550th's motto, "Blue Lightning."

The lightning bolt relates to the battalion's signal security/electronic warfare mission and the 78th's shoulder patch. The quartered border signifies military strategy and the blue background symbolizes the 50th Armored Division, its capstone division.

The 550th battalion was activated as a 1st U.S. Army Reserve unit on July 12, 1986, at Pedricktown, N.J. The battalion was formed by soldiers of the 453d ASA Company, the 345th ASA Company, the 224th MI Company, and the 338th MI Detachment. Since activation, the battalion has been training to perform its wartime mission of providing vital combat intelligence to the maneuver brigades of the 50th Armor Division.

The battalion is comprised of a headquarters and service company, a collection and jamming company, an intelligence and surveillance company, and an electronic warfare company. Members of the unit are required to drill (attend training assemblies) one weekend a month and serve on active duty for a period of two weeks each year.

A consolidated training facility (secure compartmented information (SCI) facility) at Fort Dix, N.J. was established to allow 98G linguists, 98C analysts, 97E interrogators and others to concentrate on MOS enhancement and sustainment. Selected MI soldiers attend classes at the CTF one weekend a month on a six month schedule. Elements of the battalion also participate in field training exercises and command post exercises with elements of the 50th Armor Division at least twice a year. During the 1989 training year, members of the 550th have also participated in live mission training in Germany, Panama and Key West, Fla. A recently completed (April 1989) CTF SCI command post exercise for the battalion operations center/technical control and analysis element (BOC/TCAE) was the first ever conducted by the FORSCOM Intelligence Training Detachment for reserve MI components. The Fort A.P. Hill annual training command post exercise for BOC/TCAE and the 50th Armored Division staff in May 1989 set the standard in 1st Army for capstone partnership.

The "Blue Lightning" proudly trains to keep the peace and stands ready in the tradition of the citizen soldier to perform its wartime mission when there is a call to arms.

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

Headquarters, Department of the Army

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
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